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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Network-centric warfare (NCW) established the idea that networks are becoming 
increasingly necessary and important to the modern military. Information Superiority is 
the focus of the transformational concepts outlined in Department of Defense Joint 
Vision 2020 and is the driver for the creation of the Global Information Grid (GIG). In 
order to provide the operational environment necessary to promote information 
superiority, there needs to be connectivity between all parts of shore establishments, and 
with all deployed forces at sea and ashore.  
The Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is an information technology (IT) 
services contract to provide reliable, secure, and seamless information services to the 
shore-based components of the Navy and Marine Corps. The NMCI is a critical 
component of the Department of the Navy (DoN) vision of a network-centric force, 
where a single secure, integrated network delivers all voice, video, and data IT services to 
more than 360,000 seats in more than 300 locations. Through the standardization of 
hardware and software suites, and employment of common, multi-layered security 
architecture, the NMCI will greatly improve interoperability and security across the DoN 
“Enterprise”. 
The purpose of the analysis that follows was to thoroughly examine the 
mechanisms involved with monitoring the implementation effort of NMCI, to include 
testing, and evaluate the Intranet’s performance and impact in relation to the end user. A 
brief introduction of the concepts related to the contract along with snapshots to the 
implementation numbers were provided in order to demonstrate that the implementation 
effort still remain behind schedule, no mater of continuously adjusting the associated 
timeframe. On the other hand, NMCI is the foundation that will enable DoN-wide web-
based processes, knowledge management and e-business solutions, making the decision 
to go ahead with this IT initiative an obvious one. With NMCI and by adapting to the 
new approach of “IT as a utility”,  apart from dealing with the “bandwidth-starvation” 
problem, greater efficiency and effectiveness in all facets of naval operations will be 
gained. 
 xx
The research examined the current roughly 200 different criteria and 
measurements as described by the Contract Line Item Number (CLINs) and SLAs 
used by DoN to monitor the success of the common network capability for the whole 
Department and concluded that even without DoN’s prior experiences of that type of IT 
acquisition activity, the methodology to describe and frame the NMCI was the result of a 
sound approach towards a Service-Level Agreement (SLA) contract based on practices 
already established and followed by the private sector businesses, while enforcing 
automated tools to monitor the related metrics facilitates objective establishment of the 
exact services levels.  
The NMCI contract is relying on the concept of SLA to ensure mutual 
government and provider understanding of the services to be provided and to ensure that 
stakeholders’ and users’ expectations are satisfactorily defined and executed. However, 
continuous assessment and adjustment of the SLAs are necessary in this type of 
contracting environment. The main conclusion is that the DoN and EDS after the 
completion of the “Operational Evaluation” phase should establish the SLAs at a level 
that the NMCI project delivers value for both parties and the DoN should continue to 
receive IT support as an “utility” and take advantage of the outsource idea in order to 
focus more on its core missions while exploiting IT as a force multiplier.
1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. THE “GRAND STRATEGY” ENVIROMENT 
1. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Visions and the 
Implementation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) Concept  
DoD must develop the ability to integrate combat organizations with 
forces capable of responding rapidly to events that occur with little or no 
warning. These joint forces must be scalable and task-organized into 
modular units to allow the combatant commanders to draw on the 
appropriate forces to deter or defeat an adversary. The forces must be 
highly networked with joint command and control, and must be better able 
to integrate into combined operations than the forces of today.  
(Abstract from the Quadrennial Defense Review September 2001, 
included in the Year 2003 Secretary’s of Defense Annual Report for the 
President and the Congress, p. 42) 
 
Figure 1: Joint Task Force (JTF) Operating Under the Concept of Networking 
Transformation can be defined as the process of changing form, nature or 
function. Fashioning joint operating concepts to guide the conduct of joint operations and 
2 
promote interagency cooperation are DoD leading priorities for transformation. For the 
United States (U.S.) developing the kind of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly 
to new challenges and unexpected circumstances requires changing the form or structure 
of the military forces and the nature of the military culture and doctrine supporting those 
forces; and streamlining war-fighting functions to more effectively meet the complexities 
of any type of threat. The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability 
(JKDDC) initiative, for example, is intended to leverage state-of-the-art technology to 
access knowledge and share information—in the form of education, learning, training, 
and human expertise—using a networked, knowledge-based, joint architecture that is 
interoperable within the various military services. The main idea is: 
To provide dynamic, capabilities-based training for the Department of 
Defense in support of national security requirements across the full 
spectrum of service, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational operations 
Lt Col Lyndon S. Anderson, Director of Joint Management Office (JMO), Joint 
Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) Briefing, in the 
Worldwide Joint Training Conference, USA, September 2003. 
 The JKDDC is intended to allow on-scene commanders, first responders, and 
others to seek real-time advice from subject-matter experts in the areas of language, 
culture, science, strategy, and planning at various sites across the globe. The objectives in 
mind are: 
• Prepare forces for new war-fighting concepts 
• Continuously improve joint force readiness  
• Develop individuals and organizations that think and act joint 
• Develop individuals and organizations that improvise and adapt to 
emerging crises 
• Achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means 
The focus of DoD now shifts into enabling joint operations -the ability of land, 
sea, air, and space forces to be combined under the control of a single combatant 
commander- and used in ways that are most appropriate to achieving the final objectives. 
Over the past years, the individual military departments have each proposed their 
individual models of how they would prefer to fight and DoD is now seeking to integrate 
3 
these perspectives into an overarching concept for the employment of the joint force. The 
importance of implementing the JTF concept is reflected in the priority list included in 
the 2003 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress. 
 
Figure 2: DOD’s Priorities for the Year 2004, from the Year 2003 Secretary’s of Defense 
Annual Report for the President and the Congress, p. 65) 
2. Network-Centric Warfare (NCW)   
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has emerged as the key paradigm for 
achieving the distributed war-fighting goals outlined in Department of Defense (DoD) 
Joint Vision 2020 [Note 1] and is the driver for the creation of the Global Information 
Grid (GIG). [Note2] Each of the military services under the DoD drafted “roadmaps” 
laying out their respective approaches to acquiring the kinds of capabilities described as 
leading the way toward a transformed force. The concept of NCW has become the central 
concept for organizing Department of the Navy (DoN) efforts to change and transform 
itself. The structural model for the Navy’s NCW concept is a high-performance 
information grid that quickly assimilates and shares battlefield data among Naval Forces 
worldwide. NCW shifts the emphasis from platform-centered, attrition-style operations to 
a new methodology based on enhanced speed of command and dynamic, real-time 
reorganization of sensors and shooters to meet changing mission requirements. This new 
model of warfare introduces the change from relying solely on the individual platform 
towards networking units as the medium for the conduct of Naval Operations. (Vice 
Admiral. Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy and John J. Garstka, article “Network Centric 
Warfare: Its Origins and Future” -Naval Institute Proceedings, 1997). 
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Figure 3: Logical Model for Network-Centric Warfare, from the Cebrowski and Garstka 
article “Network Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future” 
NCW focuses on using advanced information technology (IT) – computers, high-
speed data links, and networking software – to link together ships, aircraft, and shore 
installations into highly integrated computer/telecommunications networks. At the 
structural level, network-centric warfare requires an operational architecture with three 
critical elements: sensor grids and transaction (or engagement) grids hosted by a high-
quality information backplane. They are supported by value-adding command-and-
control processes, many of which must be automated to get required speed. Rapid 
information collection, analysis, dissemination, decision-making, and execution are 
critical to achieve increased combat effectiveness. The information grid will provide the 
necessary backplane for computing and communications, by enabling the operational 
architectures of sensor grids and engagement grids. The sensor grid rapidly generates 
engagement quality awareness, and the engagement grid translates this awareness into 
increased combat power.  NCW generates combat power by the fusion of networking 
sensors, decision-makers and shooters. There are two complementary ways that this is 
accomplished:  
• Network-centric warfare allows participating forces to develop speed of 
command.  
5 
• Network-centric warfare enables forces to organize from the bottom up--
or to self-synchronize--to meet the commander's intent.  
Information superiority, obtained through NCW, creates combat power by fusing 
information producers with information consumers at the right time and place across the 
battlefield. The aim is to produce increased shared situational awareness and accelerated 
speed of command with a higher tempo of operations, resulting in greater lethal 
capability and increased survivability for the operational units. 
3. The Visions of the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
The speed, volume, and diversity of knowledge required to effectively operating 
within the framework of joint military forces is continuously accelerating. Projected 
future operating environments strongly emphasize the decisive advantage conferred by 
superior information management and knowledge dominance and both will probably be 
the key to operational success in the future. Near-instantaneous collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information coupled to advanced computer-driven decision aids aim to 
unify the battle space of the 21st century. 
Our vision and our way ahead – Naval Power 21 and the Naval 
Transformation Roadmap – provide the framework to align, organize, and 
integrate our Naval Forces to meet the wide array of challenges that lie 
ahead. This will require accelerating operational concepts and 
technologies to improve war-fighting effectiveness and enhance homeland 
defense; shaping and educating our force to operate tomorrow's Fleet; 
sustaining readiness; and harvesting efficiencies to invest in the 
transformation of our Navy and Marine Corps. 
Secretary of the Navy, in his 2003 Annual report for the President and 
Congress 
The Navy’s vision focuses on four fundamental qualities of Naval Forces – 
decisiveness, sustainability, responsiveness and agility. The Navy and Marine Corps have 
defined their respective Service strategies in Sea Power 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 
21. Taken together, these visions begin to prescribe a strategy to concepts to capabilities 
technology continuum that will result in greatly enhanced power projection, protection 
and joint operational freedom. In so doing, they provide the framework for organizing, 
aligning, integrating and transforming the fully networked naval forces to meet the 
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challenges and risks that lie ahead. (Secretary of the Navy, Year 2003 Secretary’s of 
Defense Annual Report for the president and Congress, p. 163) 
Swift and effective use of information will be central to the success of Sea Power 
21. Sea Strike will rely on rich situational awareness provided by persistent intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance to sense hostile capabilities and trigger rapid and precise 
attacks. Sea Shield will use integrated information from joint military, interagency, and 
coalition sources to identify and neutralize threats far from shores, locate and destroy any 
type of challenge in littoral waters, and intercept missiles deep over land. Sea Basing will 
draw on comprehensive data to sustain critical functions afloat, such as joint command 
and logistics, ensuring operational effectiveness and timely support. (Vice Admiral 
Richard W. Mayo and Vice Admiral John Nathman, U.S. Navy, article “FORCEnet: 
Turning Information into Power”- Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2003). 
 
Figure 4: The Navy’s Vision for the 21st Century, from RADM Mike Sharp, U.S. Navy, 
Vice Commander Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command Briefing, at the NMCI – 
Industry Symposium, 19 June 2003 
The Navy is turning visions and plans into reality as it chooses which information 
and communications technologies will be integrated, which ones will be dropped, and 
which will serve as the foundation for its giant FORCEnet architectural framework. 
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FORCEnet is a massive, transformational undertaking that will integrate, align and 
enhance existing networks, sensors, commands, platforms, operations and weapons 
across the entire Navy. The goal of the project, which went through its first major field 
test in late September 2003, is faster, better decision-making for intelligent, interoperable, 
network-centric warfare. (Cheryl Gerber, (MIT Correspondent), article: “Field Test 
Highlights FORCEnet Advances”- Military Information Technology, November 2003) 
4.   FORCEnet within the JTF Concept 
FORCEnet is the enabler of Sea Power 21, turning information into power. It has 
the aim to provide the advantage of information superiority and increase responsiveness 
and survivability of participants involved. Sharing information could enable knowledge-
based operations, delivering greater power, protection, and operational independence than 
ever before possible to joint force commanders.  
 
Figure 5: FORCEnet, the New Naval Operational Environment, from RADM Mike 
Sharp, USN Vice Commander Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command Briefing, at 
the NMCI – Industry Symposium, 19 June 2003 
FORCEnet will be the operational construct and architectural framework for naval 
warfare in the information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force that is 
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scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. The goal of 
FORCEnet is to achieve superior knowledge for deployed forces, leading to increased 
combat power. A comprehensive network of sensors, analysis tools, and decision aids to 
support the full array of naval activities, from combat operations to logistics and 
personnel development will be created. The focused, timely, and accurate data delivered 
by this type of network will help decision-making at every level by allowing participants 
to draw on vast amounts of information and share the resultant understanding. This could 
increase the joint force's ability to synchronize activities throughout the battle space to 
achieve the greatest impact. 
Developing this type of capability will involve designing and implementing a 
network architecture that includes standard joint protocols, common data packaging, 
seamless interoperability, and strengthened security. FORCEnet spans across Navy and 
United States Marines Corps (USMC) mission areas and is Joint from Inception – Naval 
unique implementations are only by exception.  Some key Joint drivers towards the 
Global Information Grid include: the bandwidth expansion, the Transformational 
Communications Architecture and the Defense Information System Network [Note 3]. 
The overall technical architecture will consist of commercial standards with DoD 
standards imposed only as necessary to conform to unique military requirements.  
 
Figure 6: Integration of Systems, Information and Decision Tools towards FORCEnet, 
from RADM Mike Sharp, USN Vice Commander Space & Naval Warfare Systems 
Command Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium, 19 June 2003 
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Priority actions will include: Web-enabling the Navy; establishing open 
architecture systems and standards to allow rapid upgrades and integration; building 
common data bases to widely share information; implementing standard user interfaces to 
access information; and establishing portals that allow users to pull data from common 
servers. (Vice Admiral Richard W. Mayo, U.S. Navy and Vice Admiral John Nathman, 
U.S. Navy, article “FORCEnet: Turning Information into Power”, Naval Institute 
Proceedings, February 2003). As a direct result, a tremendous effort to integrate systems, 
information and services at the inter-service level is necessary and will require capability 
investments within and across joint, interagency and international programs. 
5. How the Navy Will Achieve Information Superiority 
Information superiority will be the key outcome of the transformational 
concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Information superiority can be defined as 
providing our forces with the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do 
the same. In a non-combat situation this means that our forces would have the necessary 
information to achieve their operational objectives. In order to provide the operational 
environment necessary to promote information superiority, there needs to be connectivity 
between all parts of shore establishments, and with all deployed forces at sea and ashore.  
This connectivity will enable an environment where all members can collaborate freely, 
share information, and organizational learning can be fostered.  (NMCI Report to 
Congress, 30 June 2000, p. J-5-1)  
DoN is building the infrastructure necessary to achieve information superiority 
and support knowledge superiority at the same time. The Web-enabled framework is 
designed to ensure mobile, seamless operations for the business and operational process 
users, and provide support tools for users to access the services and data from any 
location. Ashore, that infrastructure takes the form of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI) project that will ultimately connect all ashore Naval facilities and permit rapid, 
secure, information transfer, and universal Internet access.  At sea, SPAWAR is installing 
IT-21 capabilities on most fleet units to bring the same capability while afloat.  The 
combination of the two networks could provide universal access and information sharing 
across the entire department.  As web access becomes more available, we will begin 
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moving to a “Web enabled Navy”. The Web-enabled Navy (WEN) will be a web-service 
based layer riding on top of existing C4ISR architectures and infrastructures including the 
NMCI, IT-21, the Defense Information System Network (DISN), and commercial 
services.  The combination of these elements begins to move the Navy rapidly toward the 
goal of knowledge superiority and integrated information—the right information, 
provided to the right person at the right time. 
 
 
Figure 7: Web-enabled Navy, from RADM Mike Sharp USN Vice Commander Space & 
Naval Warfare Systems Command Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium 19 June 
2003 
 Navy and Marine Corps personnel use IT to support DoN's core business, 
scientific, research, computational activities, and war fighting activities.  The Navy’s 
effort to implement the transformational efforts that are promoted by the DoD involves 
several simultaneous IT procurement efforts, as the necessary building blocks. (Ronald 
O'Rourke, Congressional Research Service Report: Navy Network-Centric Warfare 
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Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, Order Code RS20557, June 6th of 2001, 
p. 2) For units afloat, the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program [Note 4] 
along with the IT-21 investment strategy [Note 5] are currently underway, while for 
Naval Installations ashore the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is the concept 
used to make the full range of network-based information services available to Navy and 
Marines operators for day-to-day activities, along with war-fighting supportive tasks. 
 
Figure 8: Elements of FORCEnet towards a Wide Enterprise Network (WEN), from 
RADM Mike Sharp, USN Vice Commander Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command 
Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium 19 June 2003 
The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet is a corporate-style intranet that will link 
together Navy and Marine Corps shore installations in much the same way that the IT-21 
effort will link together Navy ships. When completed, the NMCI will include a total of 
about 360,000 computer workstations, or “seats,” at numerous Naval and Marine Corps 
installations. The NMCI service area includes the Continental United States (CONUS), as 
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well as Alaska, Hawaii, Guantanamo (Cuba), Puerto Rico, and Iceland for an estimated 
360,000 Navy and Marine Corps Uniform and civilian workforce members (which 
includes 6,000 USMC reserve seats) in addition to 80,000 Navy Selected Reserve force 
members. Additionally, DoN has reserved the right to expand the NMCI service area 
outside the continental US (OCONUS) sites, beyond those listed above. (NMCI Contract 
N00024-00-D-6000, Conformed Contract P00080 10/6/2003, p. 1) 
6. The Necessity of NMCI 
 
Figure 9: Why an Intranet, from Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, Director of NMCI, NMCI 
Progress Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium 17 June 2003 
NMCI is a very important part of the tremendous integration effort currently 
underway and will contribute to the final creation of FORCEnet and the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) that are the capstone ideas under NCW. The purpose of NMCI is 
to provide the Navy and Marine Corps with secure universal access to integrated voice, 
video and data communications; eliminate interoperability problems; and remove 
network impediments to improve productivity and speed of command. The task of the 
NMCI contract seems simple enough: Bring the Navy and Marine Corps' disparate 
information technology ashore systems together under a single vendor to provide greater 
security and interoperability. 
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NMCI is the largest information technology contract ever awarded by the United 
States (U.S.) Federal Government, replacing hundreds of Navy and Marines Corps 
networks across the continental U.S. that were used before the NMCI introduction. The 
initiative is not only dealing with agencies ashore but it will provide pier-side 
connectivity for naval vessels in port, practically involving the total number of the 
Navy’s workforce (military and civilians) in the NMCI implementation. The magnitude 
of the numbers indicated that the outsourced option was the best way to go.  In a huge 
outsourcing effort, Electronic Data Systems Corp. (EDS) will take over the ownership 
and operation of the Navy and Marine Corps Information Technology (IT) hardware, 
software and other related services and will build and run a Navy and Marine Corp 
Intranet at a lower cost than what the DoN and Marine Corps were paying by purchasing 
and managing IT themselves. The contract coordinator, Texas based EDS, is a global 
leader in desktop and network management, currently overseeing more than 3.3 million 
desktops for government and commercial customers around the world. (www.eds.com 
(Facts about EDS) accessed February 2004) 
 
Figure 10: NMCI and Tactical Networks Interface, from the NMCI - Industry 
Symposium, 19 June 2003, FORCEnet–Engineering& Architecting the Navy’s IT Future 
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The concept behind the NMCI transformation effort is to apply the speed and 
opportunities of Internet technology not only in the already under strong emphasis war-
fighting tasks, but also in the very daily activities of naval personnel and especially those 
dealing with administrative and support tasks. Supporting the war-fighter are logistics, 
administration and other related operations or even training functions. These activities 
also rely heavily on IT to produce the right type of support. The goal of the NMCI 
contract is to eliminate stovepipe systems and modernize the way Navy does business. 
DoN will have network services as an enterprise level asset, with bandwidth on demand, 
making life better for every Marine, Sailor and DoN Civilian. The ultimate aim is to 
allow DoN operators to focus on their mission rather than be concerned with IT services 
and all the technical problems related with infrastructures and administration activities. 
Moving NMCI from theory towards reality has proved a challenge, because the 
Navy's information technology (IT) infrastructure must be transformed from one in which 
products are purchased piecemeal (emphasis into buying commercial off the Shelves 
(COTS) products by various vendors, without a coordinated plan) into a utility similar to 
a telephone service (one single vendor, responsible for hardware, software and IT 
services at the same time). As a result of the importance of the NMCI initiative, there has 
been a plethora of information (positive and negative) published. Almost every 
government information technology industry trade magazine has published the good but 
also the bad and the ugly side of the DoN's attempts to initiate this change. The NMCI 
initiative differs from a traditional DoD acquisition program, where typically a system is 
purchased and the government assumes configuration control and life cycle maintenance 
responsibility. The NMCI contract is for the procurement of IT services (not systems) 
based on a commercial model of Service Level Agreements (SLA). Under this model, 
the emphasis is placed on the verification, validation, and monitoring of the end-user 
services and not on the underlying infrastructure or systems. 
B. PURPOSE AND BENNEFIT OF THE STUDY 
1.  Performance Measures Used 
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and the 
Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA also known as Clinger- 
Cohen act) mandate the use of specific performance metrics for IT acquisitions. The 
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Clinger - Cohen Act requires the establishment of performance measures to assess how 
well NMCI supports mission accomplishment and for accountability and evaluation of 
investment post-deployment. Section 5123 of the ITMRA, Performance and Results-
Based Management, requires that the head of an executive agency shall: 
Ensure that performance measurements are prescribed for information 
technology used by, or to be acquired for, the executive agency and that 
the performance measurements measure how well the information 
technology supports programs of the executive agency. 
(www.cit.nih.gov (Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA)) accessed February 2004) 
The EDS-NMCI team provides services to a range of Navy and Marine Corps end 
points or as described in the contract, Service Delivery Points (SDP). These SDP include 
voice, video and data connection points for end users, the general NMCI enterprise, and 
interfaces to other DoN and DoD communications environments. The specific services to 
be provided to the end points vary but include the IT services listed in Table A, at 
Appendix A. When the NMCI contract was initially written, it laid out more than a 
hundred and thirty five (135) specific performance requirements in twenty (20) different 
categories. The Navy and EDS are continuously reviewing and adjust the SLAs that are 
the basis of measuring the performance of the NMCI.  
 
Figure 11: Summary of CLINs and the Related Domains, updated in February 2004 
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The purpose of the analysis that follows will be to briefly examine the 
mechanisms involved with monitoring the implementation effort of NMCI, as well as 
testing its performance, in relation to the end user. The research shall examine the current 
roughly 200 different criteria and measurements as described by the Contract Line Item 
Number (CLINs) and SLAs used by DoN to monitor the success of the common 
network capability for the whole Department and make recommendations regarding the 
tools and methods currently used to test and monitor the common network capability.   
2.  Concept of SLAs 
The NMCI contract works by setting out performance levels that EDS must either 
meet or beat. The Navy will pay EDS bonuses if they exceed performance levels and 
penalize them for poor performance. DoN will receive all the connectivity, customer help 
services, repair services and so on as part of the basic seat price, while the NMCI vendor 
maintains configuration management and asset management and is expected to keep the 
customer well informed of changing service and technology refreshments. The NMCI 
contract is relying on the concept of SLA to ensure mutual government and provider 
understanding of the services to be provided and to ensure that stakeholder and user 
expectations are satisfactorily defined and executed. 
 
Figure 12: Contract Model of NMCI, from Captain Chris Christopher, U.S. Navy, NMCI 
Briefing for the Joint Logistics Council, USA, 29 March 2001 
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 Traditionally, organizations list their IT requirements for procurement, in a 
statement of work that is included in the request for proposals (RFP).  SLAs expand 
this approach further by detailing the level of service and performance quality that the 
organization expects. For this process to work correctly, both the customer and vendor 
must agree up front about their expectations as well as the metrics by which quality will 
be measured. The idea is to ensure that the service levels are measuring things that 
actually matter and that the project is in line with the organization's mission. Legislation 
such as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, which links funding with agency performance, 
has been one of the main drivers behind adopting this different approach.  
SLA performance monitoring should be a continuous activity to evaluate and 
maintain the desired level of Help Desk support, customer satisfaction, system 
performance, and resources stability. While many of the services emphasize end-to-end 
performance, from a user perspective, a number of enterprise level services are viewed as 
mission critical and equally important to measure. Services covered by SLA fall into the 
following categories: 
• User upgrades 
• End user services 
• Maintenance and Help Desk services 
• Communications services 
• Systems services 
• Information assurance services 
• Seashore rotation support 
• Specific requirements 
(Navy Marine Corps Intranet Site Deployment Guide Version 1.2, 07 March 
2003, p. 41) 
The thesis shall examine what is really important to this monitoring methodology 
and analyze whether a much smaller version of critical factors can be used more 
effectively or not. Potential impacts due to the magnitude of this “DoN wide level” 
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network will also be identified, especially in terms of Department of Defense (DoD) 
Information Assurance (IA) policies and procedures. The aim will be to identify any 
weak points related with interoperability and security across the DoN and make 
appropriate recommendations to be included in future changes of the SLA’s. 
C.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis shall explore the current effort of implementing the NMCI within DoN 
and analyze the way this common network capability is tested and monitored. A snapshot 
to the implementation numbers of NMCI will be given to conclude if the effort remains 
within track or not. Additionally, the thesis will examine briefly the security policies 
related with the NMCI project and offer recommendations for improvement if possible. 
The research will provide a single source of information for managers seeking to quickly 
understand the factors influencing the end user in embracing NMCI in terms of 
Information Assurance (IA). 
 
1.  Primary Research Question 
Examining the way the NMCI implementation effort is progressing. What are the 
key factors and their impact on the effort and determine the current DoN capability to 
successfully monitor the performance measurements related with the NMCI. 
 
2.  Secondary Research Questions 
A. Is DoN facing a problem by using 200 different criteria and why is 
it using this methodology? 
B. What tools are currently available to aid in the monitoring process? 
C. Brief examination of the NMCI’s IA and security policies 
a) Suggestion of possible solutions in order to improve 
security from INTERNAL threats. 
D.   SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
The basic documents supporting this case study of the NMCI implementation 
effort will be the officially updated NMCI Contract N00024-00-D-6000, (Conformed 
Contract P00080), 10/6/2003, along with the Navy Marine Corps Intranet Site 
Deployment Guide Version 1.2, 3/07/2003. The Business Case Analysis (BCA) for 
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NMCI by Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc. (Contract GS-23F-0755H) will be used 
extensively to justify the reasons necessary to migrate towards NMCI and describe the 
impact of the common network capability in DoN’s mission. The Navy’s official website 
related with NMCI (www.nmci.navy.mil) will also be use to provide details as necessary. 
Data collected through literary research of published articles and reports in information 
technology related journals and magazines will be used to deliver the weak or strong 
points of NMCI’s implementation.  
The research will be principally qualitative in nature as it seeks to answer the 
primary and subsidiary research questions. The purpose is to determine the current status 
of NMCI’s implementation effort and deliver a list of critical factors to enable DoN in the 
determination of the Quality of Services Level (QoS) provided by the contractor. The 
thesis shall look at the general criteria currently in use and their applicability and will 
establish the general framework in order to deliver recommendations based on data 
collected through examination of Business Case Analysis (BCA) for the Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet, as well as the NMCI reports to the Congressional Committees. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following: 
1.  Examine the NMCI contracting environment to include the methodology 
and techniques for testing and the monitoring criteria used by the contractor. 
2.  Conduct a literature search of applicable reports, journal and newspaper 
articles as well as other information sources to determine various issues associated with 
the NMCI implementation efforts and their impact. 
 a. The time associated with the conduct of the research indicated that 
the early years of the contract up to the year 2003 should be examined in the background 
section of the thesis. Developments in the year 2003 and later are covered in the data 
collection section. 
3. Determine the impact of NMCI on end users, in terms of IA. 
4. Analyze the criteria used to evaluate NMCI’s performance. 
5. Make recommendations based upon research and analysis. 
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F. ENDNOTES 
1. Joint Vision 2020, released May 30 2000 and signed by the chairman of   
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Henry Shelton, extends the concepts laid out in Joint 
Vision 2010. "Full-spectrum dominance" is the key   term in "Joint Vision 2020," the 
blueprint DoD will follow in   the future. While full-spectrum dominance is the goal, the 
way to get there   is to "invest in and develop new military capabilities." The   four 
capabilities at the heart of full-spectrum dominance are: dominate maneuver, precision 
engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. (Jim Garamone  
(American Forces Press Service), article “Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum 
Dominance”, (www.defenselink.mil (Joint Vision 2020), accessed January 2004) 
2. The DoD’s building blocks of this information grid consist of more than 3 
million individual computers on 12,000 local area networks (LANs). These 
interconnected classified and unclassified computers and LANs form the Global 
Information Grid (GIG), which supports combatant commanders, fixed installations and 
deployed forces around the world. The GIG supports every component of the DoD, 
including war-fighters, policymakers and business processes. (Major General J. David 
Bryan (Vice Director of Defense Information Systems Agency), article “IA: Holistic 
View, Targeted Response”, Military Information Technology, September 2003) The GIG 
relies on commercial technology to tackle information security challenges. 
3. The Unclassified But Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network, or 
“NIPRNet” and the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or “SIPRNet” comprises 
the Defense Information System Agency’s Defense Information Systems Network 
(DISN).  The essentiality of these networks has developed over time, and has been 
accelerated by the increasing dependence of the Department of Defense on the Internet as 
a common business process infrastructure.  Taken together, these two data networks 
provide the essential information necessary to conduct and support the full range of 
military operations. Both the NIPRNet and the SIPRNet are Wide Area Networks 
(WAN), consisting of routers, modems, encryption devices and other ancillary equipment 
interconnected by high capacity data links and distributed throughout the world. In 
addition, these networks will continue to grow in importance to the Department of 
Defense as “Community of Interest” networks are developed and fielded.  These Service-
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specific networks will be using the NIPRNet and SIPRNet as the common data transport 
infrastructure.  The largest of these networks at the moment is the Navy and Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI).  (Major General David Bryan, Vice Director of the Defense 
Information Systems Agency and the Commander of the Joint Task Force Computer 
Network Operations, Testimony to the Congressional subcommittee on the Department of 
Defense responsibility for the protection of its computer networks from cyber attack, 17 
May 2001) 
4. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system is intended to 
provide the capability for a warship to cooperatively engage targets by using data from 
other CEC-equipped ships, aircrafts and land target sensors, even in a jamming 
environment. The CEC system links U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular 
area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each 
platform is transmitted on a real-time basis to the other units in the network.  The system 
works in conjunction with individual ship, aircraft and shore systems and it also provides 
a common, consistent highly accurate air picture, allowing for battle group defense as one 
integrated system, by networking assets together. (COTS Journal, Interview of [U.S.] 
Captain Dan Busch, Cooperative Engagement Capability, August 2001) 
5. IT-21, which stands for IT for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment 
strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed 
to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and 
between Navy ships. The IT-21 network will be built around commercial, off-the-shelf 
(COTS) desktop computers and networking software. (Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional 
Research Service Report: Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and 

































A. OVERVIEW OF THE NMCI CONTRACT  
1.  Historical Data and Modifications of the Contract Until the Year 2003 
NMCI is an IT initiative and procurement strategy to provide secure, seamless, 
global end-to-end connectivity for Naval war-fighting tasks and enhance business 
functionality. Ensuring that this intranet is interoperable within the Global Information 
Grid (GIG), it will interface with other joint forces’ systems.  Through the NMCI 
program, the United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps (USMC) aim to 
procure IT services through a commercial seat management contract, with the intend to 
deliver comprehensive, end-to-end information services via a common computing and 
communications environment. The DoN conducted an informal analysis of alternatives in 
the spring of 1999 and determined that commercially contracted seat management 
represented the best option to efficiently satisfy current and future DoN IT support 
requirements. (Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Business Case Analysis (BCA) for NMCI, 
(Contract GS-23F-0755H), 6/30/2000, p. 1)  
 
Figure 13: The Evolution of NMCI towards Reality, by Joseph Cipriano, PEO for IT, 
from his NMCI briefing at the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Association, San Diego-USA, 16 February 2000 
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However, it is necessary to note that the initial estimates for implementation from 
the Navy and the views expressed by the potential contractors were quite optimistic. 
Taking into account the technical complexity, the magnitude of the effort and the fact that 
both parties were moving into “uncharted waters” with standards and specifications in a 
continuous flux, there were delays occurring during the negotiations even as early as the 
establishment of business proposals phase. The incremental realization of the technical 
obstacles necessary to overcome by every participant in the NMCI effort indicated that 
more time was needed. However, the significant importance of the need to create uniform 
standards and applications for the DoN enterprise pointed towards moving ahead no 
matter the adjustments necessary. Finally, the contract was awarded to Electronic Data 
Systems Corp. (EDS) on the 6th of October 2000, for a total of $6.9 billion and duration 
of five years plus three optional years at the Department of the Navy (DoN) discretion. 
The final bid was about $3 billion less than the three other bidders—Computer Sciences 
Corp., IBM Corp. and General Dynamics Corp. NMCI’s transformation effort aims to 
bring together the vast majority of DoN personnel; military, government civilians and 
contractors into a single integrated IT environment.  
 
Figure 14: Revised NMCI Contract Timetable (Year 2001), by Captain Chris Christopher 
from his NMCI Briefing for the Joint Logistics Council, USA, 29 March 2001 
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This adjustment in the time-schedule involved with the NMCI implementation 
was only the first of the many to come. Much was at stake for EDS and the Navy in the 
NMCI program. For the Navy, NMCI offered the opportunity to fundamentally redesign 
and modernize its day-to-day operations by replacing an unplanned hodgepodge of 
standalone PCs and multiple local area networks that grew up over decades and do not 
communicate with each other. Additionally, as the largest federal information technology 
project ever attempted, the pressure on the project was intense: Many within the military 
and intelligence establishments were closely watching the effort because of President 
Bush’s mandate to improve internal communications for homeland security. For EDS, the 
project represented a large chunk of business and also provides the company with a high-
profile platform to demonstrate its capabilities to other military and civilian agencies 
contemplating similar seat management projects. Needless to say, the NMCI contract 
represented (and still is) the “Crown Jewel” in the extremely competitive IT services 
market. 
Implementing NMCI globally across an organization as large as the Navy and 
Marine Corps requires cultural change, this, does not come without some degree of 
anxiety and after overcoming a variety of obstacles. Additionally, Congress has been 
skeptical about the cost benefit of the project ever since it was proposed. The Navy was 
originally set to announce the contract award in May 2000, but it was delayed for more 
than four months after Congress raised objections. The main concerns were the amount of 
money involved and institutional resistance towards change within the services. From the 
early steps of the NMCI implementation, the multi billion dollars project had turned into 
a major technology headache for the USN/USMC and EDS.  
The project already was a year behind schedule, and many in Congress were 
concerned it would not stay within its authorized budget. Members of the Armed Services 
committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate began asking tough questions 
related with NMCI. They wanted to know in every detail how much money the Navy was 
already spending on desktop IT products and services, how it would pay for NMCI, what 
the project exact schedule would be, and how it would impact the Navy’s civilian 
employees and small business partners. Disagreement between the Navy and the 
Pentagon about the level of testing required for NMCI delayed the project and raised 
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even more concerns within Congress. The Navy advocated commercial testing 
procedures; the Pentagon wanted more stringent testing measures such as those applied to 
weapons systems. Among the problems, the Navy discovered that instead of a few 
thousand software applications, its systems actually housed a staggering 100,000. 
Hundreds of old applications could not be moved to the new system, meaning that 
hundreds of workers were forced to have two computers on their desks. The large number 
of old applications uncovered another set of problems: Some programs could not be 
merged into the new system. They were either too antiquated to be compatible with the 
standard NMCI operating system (Microsoft Windows 2000), or it was not even possible 
to determine their level of compliance with the new security requirements of NMCI.  
A compromise was reached and incorporated into the Defense authorization bill, 
S. 1438, which passed the Senate on the 13th of December 2001 and allowed the Navy to 
order additional seats under NMCI after specific testing and performance milestones 
were reached. This event-driven implementation of NMCI was introduced to ensure that 
the program would be fully tested and proven through its introduction into Navy and 
Marine field units. (Gail Repsher Emery, article: “After slow start, Congress learning to 
like NMCI”, Washington Technology magazine, February 2002) The incompatible 
applications had been “quarantined” in separate terminals, meaning that for a specific 
timeframe some employees have two computers; one handling the new system's traffic 
and another with the old programs, but they were able to continue with their normal 
business. As for the legacy applications, the Navy adopted an approach called “ruthless 
rationalization,” the objective of which was to eliminate all unnecessary applications and 
reduce the number in place to fewer than 10,000; the goal was 1,000. With most of the 
initial misgivings resolved and better communication between Congress and the Navy, 
lawmakers approved $582 million for NMCI in the 2002 Defense Authorization Act.  
But the legislation also established milestones and conditions including rigorous 
testing, that the high-profile program should satisfy in order to win funding during the 
next budget cycle. The bill also required the Navy Secretary to report to Congress on the 
testing and implementation of NMCI, when the Navy would order more seats, and also 
when EDS would assume responsibility for more seats, according to the proposed 
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schedule laid out. Additionally, it required the Navy to appoint a manager for NMCI 
whose sole responsibility was to oversee and direct the program.  
In the period between March to May 2002, an independent third party, 
Management Systems Designers, Inc. (MSD) announced the NMCI Contractor’s Test and 
Evaluation (CTE) phases 2 & 3 were completed successfully, at the first NMCI 
operational sites at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval Air Facility, 
Washington, DC; Naval Air Station Lemoore, California; and network operating centers 
at Norfolk, Virginia and San Diego, California, therefore removing the legislative barriers 
and making way for additional “seats” to be ordered .[Note 1] The NMCI system also 
passed a test according to the DoD established framework and guidance, in May 2002, 
verifying that it was working properly. Under an agreement between Pentagon and Navy 
officials, the Navy was permitted to roll out about 60,000 seats as a test of the feasibility 
of the project. John Stenbit, CIO at the U.S. Department of Defense, approved on May 3 
the continued rollout of the NMCI after EDS successfully passed initial tests conducted 
on the pilot seats that were already in place. Achievement of “Milestone One” allowed 
DoN to order an additional 100,000 seats. However, Navy officials and outside experts 
acknowledged that the program still faced significant challenges, particularly in the areas 
of change management and legacy system integration. 
DoN officially turned up the heat on EDS on August 2002, when it began 
monitoring the service users were receiving through NMCI. Those service-level 
agreements kicked in on the 9th of August, when NMCI passed the 20,000-user mark. 
Under a September 2001 agreement with Pentagon officials, EDS and the Navy had to 
review the service levels for a month and conduct an “operational assessment” that shows 
that the data monitored by the enterprise management system is accurate. In the same 
month, the NMCI team reached another critical milestone, with the Pentagon giving the 
Navy the go-ahead to connect about 40,000 users working on the Defense Department's 
classified network, SIPRNET. More specifically, SIPRNET is DoD's classified network 
that military personnel use for accessing classified applications and databases and for 
secure messaging. Although it uses common Internet Protocol (IP) standards, it is 
physically and logically separated from all other computer systems, because it is using 
dedicated encrypted lines for transmission. 
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With the pace of the program accelerating, DoN and EDS decided to “tighten” the 
service-level agreements that are the basis of measuring the performance of NMCI. 
(Christopher J. Dorobek, article: “Navy, EDS to refine performance metrics”-Federal 
Computer Week, September 2002) Such tinkering should be a normal part of a 
performance-based IT contract and the operation of the enterprise management system, 
monitoring the SLAs was one of the questions at the heart of NMCI's next milestone. The 
Pentagon had already asked DoN to demonstrate the capability of accurately monitoring 
service levels across the whole available network. Additionally, the Defense Operational 
Test and Evaluation division completed its independent assessment and testing of NMCI 
on the 4th of October, which would provide the data for the project's next significant 
milestone, demonstration of the contractor’s with the established SLAs. Those tests 
showed mixed results, but the overall consensus of those involved with the management 
of the NMCI initiative was that the newly built system had all the potentials to achieve its 
specified goals. On the positive side, the same evaluation concluded that NMCI's external 
security met SLA goals. Internal security needed improvement in password and 
configuration management, but the Common Access Card Public Key Infrastructure 
cryptographic login should provide additional security when implemented. 
Some of those problems discovered in the testing included: 
• Reach-back to legacy e-mail was slow. 
• Help-desk performance was below service level goals 
• Performance at the workstation level was inconsistent. 
• Configuration management, incident and problem management processes 
were immature. (Matthew French, article: “NMCI Testing shows mixed 
results”- Federal Computer Week, December 2002) 
We are now in Part Two of the process, and that is to brief those who need 
to be briefed [to receive approval] to go beyond that 60,000-seat cutover 
and ensure the service level agreements to go to an order beyond 160,000 
seats 
Rear Admiral Charles Munns, U.S. Navy, NMCI director, from the 
Mathew French article 
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The contract model has always called for the firm to invest money upfront and 
make a profit later. Deploying the equipment and manpower has been costly for EDS. 
After already investing $650 million to $800 million in the Navy intranet, it discovered 
that it would take longer than expected to turn a profit. Given its weak financial position, 
reaching profitability was increasingly important. Nevertheless, the Navy asked Congress 
to extend the contract for two more years, which would make up for delays and allow 
EDS to recoup its costs. The contract received a significant modification in the 30th of 
October 2002. EDS Corp. was awarded a $1,916,000,000 modification to the previously 
contract (N00024-00-D-6000) for an extension to add two years to the basic contract 
period. (www.defenselink.mil (DOD News: Contracts for October 30, 2002) accessed 
February 2004) The final modification of the contract has resulted into a base period of 
seven (7) program years and maintains the option for an additional three (3) program 
years. 
2. Establishment of SLAs 
NMCI represents more than just the harmonizing of hundreds of separate systems 
within ashore installations. DoN is adopting an approach that has already been extremely 
successful for industry, by purchasing IT services that include hardware, software, 
maintenance and training. While many commercial organizations in the past have 
employed service level agreements (SLAs) for information technology acquisition and 
maintenance, the NMCI represents one of the few instances where a government agency 
has adopted this approach, therefore pioneering the way. The heart of every performance-
based contract is the SLA that defines satisfactory performance, computes payment, and 
measures success. The first and most important step in a performance-based contract is 
selecting and specifying achievable performance levels.  
To ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps had adequate opportunity to outline 
their requirements and expectations, representatives from the various stakeholder groups 
contributed input from the early inception of the project, to include feedback from the 
end user team. They met on a regular basis to determine necessary features, the value of 
each feature to a specific group and DoN in general, affordable and acceptable costs, 
appropriate incentives for vendors that were all included in the SLAs and the RFP for the 
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NMCI contract. Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a specifically defined level of 
performance required by the NMCI contract.  
 
Figure 15: The DoN’s Approach to Determine the SLA’s Related with NMCI (via 
interaction with the potential providers and end-users), by Captain Chris Christopher 
from his NMCI Briefing for the Joint Logistics Council, USA, 29 March 2001 
The NMCI contract includes a total of thirty-seven (37) SLA’s and establishes 
financial penalties if the contractor fails to meet them. This utility-like costing and billing 
style associated with NMCI is expected to result in numerous benefits like lower overall 
costs, faster IT acquisition cycles and easier integration of new personnel into a 
command. It is a common standard within industry that service level performance should 
be based, in part, on end-user satisfaction and that the specific level of satisfaction should 
be measured by a third party that is independent of both the Navy and EDS. As a result, 
there are incentives included within the contract to motivate superior contractor’s 
support. EDS could earn hundreds of millions of dollars if it meets certain specific 
standards. (Matthew French, article: Survey says... NMCI users satisfied, Federal 
Computer Week, 24 March 2003). These incentives are: 
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• A one-time $10 million payment when all 360,000 seats have been 
transitioned to NMCI. 
• Up to $1.25 million per year for using small and disadvantaged businesses 
as subcontractors. 
• Up to $144 million per year for meeting customer satisfaction goals — 
based on earning $25 per seat per quarter if customer satisfaction levels 
are at 85 percent, $50 per seat per quarter for 90 percent customer 
satisfaction or $100 per seat per quarter for 95 percent customer 
satisfaction. 
• Up to $10 million per year for information assurance if NMCI performs 
well in unannounced "information warfare" tests of the network's security 
and survivability. 
Each SLA is quite extensive in details and includes: 
• Service Name 
• Service Description 
• Service Delivery Points 
• Performance Categories 
• Performance Measurement Requirements 
• Performance Requirements 
• Equivalent Level of Service 
o Level of Service 1 - Basic 
o Level of Service 2 - High End   
o Level of Service 3 - Mission Critical  
In the following Table (Table 1) the analytical description of the randomly 
selected SLA 2 is presented, in order to provide an example of the final level of details 
included within the contract, while Table B at Appendix B provides the analytical 
description of the monitoring performance criteria involved with the NMCI, along with 






Table 1: NMCI SLA 2 Analytical Description, from the original NMCI Contract 
N00024-00-D-6000, 30 Oct 2002 
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The following Table (Table 2) provides the cumulative list of SLA, still in effect 





Table 2: Cumulative NMCI Standard Target Performance Measures, from the NMCI 
Contract N00024-00-D-6000, 30 October 2002 
 
Figure 16: Breakdown of NMCI SLAs, by Captain Chris Christopher, from the NMCI 
Briefing for the Joint Logistics Council, 29 March 2001 
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3. The Transition towards NMCI 
a. Companies Involved 
EDS, as the coordinator of the NMCI contract has assumed the 
responsibility for providing all assets and services needed to ensure the transmission of 
voice, video and data across DoN. In order to fulfill the requirements of the contract, 
EDS has formed a partnership with leading businesses in the domain of IT, under the title 
Information Strike Force (ISF). Their roles and responsibilities are as follows: 
(www.nmci-isf.com (EDS-NMCI Team), accessed February 2004) 
• EDS for overall service delivery  
• Raytheon for security and information assurance  
• MCI for the Wide Area Network (WAN)  
• WAM! NET for Base Area Network (BAN)/ Local Area Network 
(LAN)/Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) 
• General Dynamics for the BAN/LAN/ MAN  
• Robbins-Gioia for project scheduling  
• Cisco for routers and switches  
• Microsoft for software  
• Dell for desktops, laptops, servers and enterprise storage systems  
• Dolch for desktop and portable embarkables  
• Dataline for voice services  
• Hundreds of small businesses for help desk, network operations 
center and field services 
b. The Plan Used 
The transition to NMCI is divided into distinctive phases, resulting into 
an evolutionary process used to gradually transform USN and USMC sites from the 
previous IT environment towards NMCI. The idea is to: 
• Adopt an incremental approach 
• Leverage current contractors   
• Use empowered, on-site teams 
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• Minimized disruptions to ongoing operations 
 
Figure 17: Transitioning Sites into NMCI. 
In more details the procedure and its supporting activity can be broken 
down as follows (www.nmci.navy.mil (Transition to NMCI), accessed February 2004) 
Phase 1: Pre-AOR [Planning Phase]  
The planning phase begins when DoN awards a task order for NMCI 
services to the ISF.  During this phase, the ISF collects the information it needs for initial 
work force development and planning activities based on the total site 
order.  Assumption of Responsibility (AOR) is defined as the date when 
responsibility for operating the "as-is" (current IT) environment, for work defined 
by the ordered NMCI CLINs, shifts from the government and its local contractors 
to the Information Strike Force (ISF). During this phase, ISF validation teams arrive 
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on the implementation location to begin collecting data and to coordinate long lead-time 
activities. The validation teams assess information technology and warehouse facilities, 
security accreditation, legacy applications, and WAN provisioning. The teams also begin 
to make detailed assessments of the Base Area Network/Local Area Network 
(BAN/LAN) and the existing desktop and server environments, and collect additional 
information on security hardware in order to finalize the NMCI design. The following 
means are used to coordinate activities: 
• Preliminary Site Questionnaire (PSQ):  Collection tool that assists 
commands in collecting required data prior to their transition to the NMCI 
environment. Includes detail about: 
o Data Network Organization 
o Registered IP Addresses 
o Current Network Infrastructure Components 
o Current Servers 
o Wide Area Network (WAN)  
o Local Area Network (LAN)  
o Legacy Software Applications (non-COTS) 
o COTS Software Applications 
o Existing Hardware 
o Trouble Call / Help Desk Support 
o COMSEC 
o Information Assurance 
o Contracting / Procurement 
• AOR Checklist:  Defines the actions required by ISF, the customer 
and the government Program Office to achieve ISF Assumption of Responsibility 
at a site.  
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• Site Concurrence Memorandum (SCM): Define the roles and 
responsibilities of the ISF and Navy Marine Corps organizations at individual 
sites for the accomplishment of transition to NMCI 
• Government Furnished Facility (GFF) Checklists:  Assess the 
suitability of proposed government-furnished facilities for use as server farms and 
supporting facilities, by the ISF team 
• List of Potentially Impacted Federal Civilian Employees: (Self-
explanatory)   
• Contractor Ordering Process:  Amplifying information on ordering 
NMCI services for government contractors who support the DoN 
Phase 2: AOR to Cutover [Site Preparation] 
During the site preparation phase, the ISF team completes the build out 
necessary for the operation of NMCI. Activities include furnishing, installing, and testing 
the NMCI site enterprise, and beginning infrastructure work in order to finalize 
implementation and cutover plans. The following tools are used during this phase: 
• Cutover Checklist: The Cutover Checklist defines the actions 
required of all those involved to achieve start of Cutover to NMCI. 
• Legacy Applications Transition Guide:  Governs required actions 
for collecting detailed information on legacy applications prior to transitioning to 
NMCI. 
o ISF Tools Web Site/IT Survey Tools & Related Files: 
Legacy application information and application certification status 
information.  
o Classified Legacy Applications Rationalized List 
Template:  Guidance for submission of classified legacy applications. 
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o NMCI Legacy Applications Submissions Guide: Describes 
how to submit unclassified and classified application media for NMCI 
certification & validation testing. 
o Engineering Review Questionnaires:  Completed to 
facilitated accreditation process. 
o NMCI Release Development & Deployment Guide: 
Information and guidance to developers interested in migrating content, 
introducing new applications, or changing existing applications within 
NMCI.  
Phase 3: Cutover [Site Transformation] 
Cutover is the final major milestone in the NMCI transition process. It is 
that date when the ISF and government site personnel initiate the deployment of NMCI 
seats and services on site. Tools used to support the procedure are: 
• Cutover Checklist: The Cutover Checklist defines the actions 
required to achieve start of Cutover to NMCI 
• Workstation Migration:  
o Ready Guide:  overview of processes and procedures 
leading to the installation of NMCI seats and the software training 
programs available after installation 
o Workstation Set Guides:  Step-by-step instructions for the 
user to prepare the existing workstation for the rollout process 
o Desktop User Share Guides: Assist in transferring the user 
file access available between Legacy workstations, called desktop user 
shares, to the networked environment of NMCI. 
o Workstation Migration User Guide  
• Legacy Microsoft Server Migration Guide:  Establishment of 
strategy for integrating legacy application servers with NMCI. 
• Remote Access Service Guides  
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• Outlook Web Access Users Guide  
• NMCI Asset Disposal  
 
Figure 18: Summary of the Activity to Transition towards an Operational Site with 
NMCI 
Phase 4: Meeting SLAs-[Site Operational] 
The building activity of the site, to include testing of the facility, has 
finished and the site is now under the EDS-ISF technical responsibility and support. The 
driver behind the operational concept is to conform to the SLAs that describe the desired 
level of services. 
4. Key Policies and Regulations 
a. NMCI Interoperability and C4I Support 
DoN was committed to ensure that interoperability within Naval 
establishments and with the joint community within DoD would not be degraded in the 
new IT environment and used NMCI to lay the groundwork for significant improvements 
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in the domain of communications. The NMCI project would ensure continued 
interoperability within the GIG and along with other Department of Defense Enterprise 
level applications, while through the NMCI contract requirements DoN would maintain 
access to all legacy applications. Two major aspects of interoperability had been 
identified for special emphasis: 
• Operational Architectures 
• Compatibility of NMCI IT services with existing external 
applications 
Interoperability and C4I Support were documented as firm NMCI 
requirements throughout the NMCI Request for Proposal and in the Test Planning related 
documentation. Additionally, DoN imposed the requirement for the NMCI vendor to 
generate and use a separate Interoperability Test Plan. The NMCI RFP incorporated a 
draft Interface Control Document (ICD) that cited specific standards, interfaces and 
partners for which interoperability had to be maintained. This document provided 
detailed descriptions and specifications of the interfaces between the NMCI and other 
Defense related networks. The ICD was used to enforce the NMCI vendor to comply 
with the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) [Note 2]. The NMCI RFP established SLAs 
that include interoperability metrics requiring both real time threshold reporting and 
periodic reporting. The NMCI vendor was required to propose specific mechanisms to 
measure interoperability of 23 separate services. (NMCI Report to Congress, 30th of June 
2000, p. D-4-1) 
b. Test and Evaluation Strategy 
The NMCI contract provides for Inspection and Acceptance as the method 
for verifying that the services provided by the Contractor are in compliance with the 
requirements of the contract. Inspection and acceptance should be performed using a 
combination of the following two methodologies and demonstration of successful service 
delivery is defined as successfully completing both aspects:  
• Contractor executed testing and verification against contract 
requirements with contractor-developed and Government-approved test processes 
and procedures. 
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• Government execution, with contractor support, of government 
developed test processes and procedures. (NMCI Report to Congress, 30th of June 
2000, p. D-5-1) 
NMCI services Inspection and acceptance were divided into two distinct periods: 
• Proof of concept testing and evaluation. (NMCI First Installation 
Increment) Successful completion of proof of concept testing and evaluation 
constituted achievement of Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the NMCI 
implementation  
• Transition testing and evaluation  
c. NMCI Governance 
Federal statutes, DoD and DoN directives provide the overarching policy 
that governs every aspect of NMCI and the related computing environment. The Director 
NMCI is manages the acquisition of NMCI and provides additional acquisition guidance 
to the Navy and Marine Corps NMCI Program Managers, while operating within the 
policy constraints of DoD’s acquisition regulations framework.  
 
Figure 19: The NMCI Operational Relationships-Historic Evolution and Purpose 
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The Navy and Marine Corps organizations responsible for network 
operations and security oversee the operation of NMCI.  Within the Navy this is Naval 
Network and Space Operations Command (NNSOC).  Within the Marine Corps this is 
the Director Headquarters Marine Corps C4.  These organizations work closely to 
develop operating and security policies that govern the day-to-day operations of the 
NMCI.  These policies reflect higher-level guidance from the DoD, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Department of the Navy CIO, along with the Navy Information Officer and 
the Marine Corps Chief Information Officer. (www.nmci.navy.mil (Policy Statement), 
accessed February 2004) 
 
Figure 20: NMCI Governance, from Rear Admiral J. P. Cryer, U.S. Navy, Commander of 
Naval Network and Space Operations Command, NMCI Operations Brief at the NMCI – 
Industry Symposium, 18 June 2003 
NNSOC is the operational arm of NETWARCOM for network and space 
operations. NNSOC’s role in NMCI Network Operations is as follows: 
• Global Network Operations Center (GNOC)-Detachment Norfolk 
supporting 310,000 planned users by end of year 2003 
• NNSOC teams with: 
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o Director NMCI for NMCI cutovers & installs 
o SPAWAR PMW-161 for contract issues 
o Operational Direction in support of Fleet Commanders  
o Supports NETWARCOM NMCI Governance process  
o Maintains NMCI Security oversight 
o Manages Sea Shore Rotation (SSR) for associated 
personnel 
NMCI Security roles can be summarized as follows: 
• Administration (NAVNETWARCOM) 
o Designated Approval Authority (DAA) 
o Establishes policies and procedures for all Navy networks 
o Approves Certification and Accreditation of the network 
• Operations (NNSOC) 
o Directs the contractor (EDS) at the operational level 
o Implement Information Assurance Vulnerabilities-Alerts / 
Bulletins / Technical Advisories  
o Change Information Conditions (INFOCON) 
o Ensures adherence to DoD/DoN security policy 
o –Manages contractor’s responses to security incidents 
5. Impact on the DoN Mission 
NMCI has the potential to enhance and improve enterprise-wide working 
procedures and training, by providing common IT services across the Navy & Marine 
Corps enterprise. Additionally, by having as a requirement the support of new initiatives 
such as knowledge management, distance learning, and telemedicine, it has the potential 
to significantly improve the quality of life for Department of the Navy employees and 
support personnel. By bringing together the Navy and Marine Corps ashore workforce 
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into a common IT infrastructure, NMCI will foster greater levels of communication, 
collaboration and sharing of ideas than would ever have been possible before.  
The BCA for the NMCI strongly emphasized that the previous IT environment 
was providing adequate operational and strategic support for the DoN mission. NMCI is 
introduced with the aim to be the tool enabling and the driver supporting innovations in 
business processes and practices that are necessary to create a totally new, improved 
Naval-operating environment, with significant financial savings through superior 
management of resources and personnel. The idea of widely available data that is 
consistent throughout the enterprise will promote fundamental changes in the way the 
Navy is conducting its business or transactions, training sailors and even supporting 
critical war-fighting tasks. 
Current Environment Requirement (NMCI) 
Large disparity in quality of service across 
the DoN 
Consistent (high) level of service for 
ALL DoN end users  
Redundant procurement, sourcing and 
support infrastructures  
Consolidated sourcing, support and 
procurement  
Unmanaged cost environment – allocated 
from a variety of budget sources (IT budgets, end of 
year money, etc.). Lack of visibility into true cost of 
IT. 
Cost is discrete, competitive with 
current IT spending.  Full visibility into cost of 
IT services. 
Fragmented, inconsistent and informal Help 
Desk. 
“One-stop” help desk support. 
Non-IT systems adversely impacted by 
inconsistent performance of IT systems and current 
support model. 
Improved productivity for all IT users. 
Insufficient asset management. Comprehensive asset management, 
tracking, and configuration control standard in 
commercial best practices.  Asset management 
role switched from DoN to vendor. 
Navy personnel managing many networks. Allow DoN personnel to refocus on 
core mission.  Key network attributes managed 
through a central DoN IT organization. 
Table 3: Comparisons Made Between the Previous and the Expected NMCI IT 
environment, from the BCA for the NMCI 
Last but not least, NMCI will provide  significantly improved level of security, 
with protection from outside attack as well as internal safeguards. From a technology 
standpoint, NMCI is not only intended to address the problems that various commands 
experienced in the past when attempting to share information through collaborative tools 
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and e-mail. With the continuous focus on security that has become a critical concern for 
military and industry organizations alike, a cohesive system will reduce the number of 
potential entryways that increase organizations' vulnerabilities to information operations 
and “malicious cyber-activity”.  
 
Figure 21: NMCI Impact for DoN, at the Enterprise Level 
The idea behind NMCI is to create a system that will enable the Navy to carry out 
all kinds of service-wide initiatives, from providing a portal for common information to 
streamlining training opportunities. Over the long term this contract should permit more 
frequent refresh of hardware, infrastructure upgrades, enterprise distribution of advanced 
applications, and continuous improvement in operations. The economic benefits of NMCI 
include fixed per-seat pricing; the economy of scale - buying from a single provider; 
shared cost savings; and regular technology refreshes to upgrade hardware every three 
years and software every two years at no additional cost.  
The benefits of the NMCI environment include a significant reduction in the Total 
Cost of Ownership for the DoN IT infrastructure that will accompany improved and 
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consistent levels of service and performance for all Navy and Marine Corps CONUS IT 
customers.   The contractor will handle systems administration, purchasing, training and 
maintenance, allowing more sailors and marines to concentrate on their core mission or 
even re-assigned to different tasks. At the same time, users will have quicker access to 
the most up-to-date equipment without costly procurements or large up-front capital 
expenditures.  
NMCI has a favorable impact on the Navy in the following three areas: 
1.  Mission 
• NMCI's integrated approach allows operations staff to coordinate 
their efforts quickly and efficiently to make decisions and provide ready access to 
the real-time information needed to make decisions.  This yields improved access, 
interoperability, and security. 
• Operational readiness improvement as a consequence of the 
dependable connectivity that NMCI will provide and the more efficient 
telecommunications operations that are not achievable with DoN's current IT 
infrastructure.  
• Increased productivity achieved through better access to 
information services, better connectivity with peers and other organizations, 
improved communications/interoperability, and ease of use across platforms (i.e., 
same look and feel of the access point) regardless of location. 
• Improved productivity at the command level through streamlined 
budgeting and planning, on-line training and enterprise software deployment. 
2.  Technical Architecture 
• Improved business processes through enhanced standardization 
and harmonization of IT services, ability to keep pace with technological change, 
increased reliability and availability. 
• Enabling ERP, which is a principal Navy Revolution in Business 
Affairs (RBA) Initiative. 
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• Establishment of desktop and server standards and configurations, 
many of which could be rolled out remotely via the Internet and administered 
from a centralized point within the new support model.  
• More consistent Help desk learning as the number of different 
types of hardware, software, and configurations will decrease allowing help desk 
technicians to better focus on the environment they are maintaining. 
• Extended sharing of knowledge and expertise worldwide. 
• Improved VTC capability. 
3.  Personnel / Service 
• Creation of collaborative information databases and resources. 
• Empowered innovative work and training solutions. 
• Enhanced quality of life and/or work for every Marine, Sailor, and 
civilian in the DoN workforce.  By-products of NMCI such as on-line training, a 
standard look and feel across the Naval IT spectrum, a consolidated Help Desk 
and MOS/NEC stability and retention will each contribute to the enhanced quality 
of life (Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., Business Case Analysis (BCA) for NMCI, 
(Contract GS-23F-0755H), 6/30/200, pp. 75-77) 
To summarize, this new approach towards IT will help USN and USMC meet the 
following objectives: (www.nmci-isf.com (About NMCI), accessed January 2004) 
• Enhanced network security  
• Interoperability among them as well as other Services 
• Instant Web access  
• Knowledge sharing across the globe 
• Consistent office environment  
• Increased productivity  
• Improved systems reliability and quality of service  
• Reduced cost of voice, video and data services  
• Better, faster decision-making  
• Greater productivity reduced costs 
• Increased combat readiness 
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B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION FOR THE EARLY STAGES OF NMCI 
The previous DoN computing environments were so varied and complex that it 
was exceedingly difficult to communicate electronically across the Department.  
Virtually every major command and installation has its own process for acquisition, 
management, maintenance, and disposal of IT systems.  Without a single DoN source for 
configuration control and minimal hardware standards, the local and/or regional IS 
management staff often set standards without integration of the tactical, operational, and 
strategic requirements of communications across DoN organizations. The Navy Marine 
Corps Intranet (NMCI) is an information technology (IT) services contract to provide 
reliable, secure, and seamless information services to the shore-based components of the 
Navy and Marine Corps.  
The approach offered by the Information Strike Force (ISF), a partnership of 
companies with world wide recognition under the coordination of EDS, a leading 
company in providing E-business and information technology services to government and 
commercial clients around the world, uses an incremental delivery plan to create a single, 
integrated network IT environment, with standardized software suites and one security 
architecture in order to maximize security and enhance performance and interoperability 
across the entire spectrum of the Department of the Navy (DoN) agencies  
1. Analytical Breakdown of NMCI Implementation Events up to the 
Year 2003.  
1999  
July 7: Navy briefs industry on NMCI  
Oct. 6: Request for information released  
Dec. 23: RFP released 
2000 
Apr. 28: Revised solicitation released  
May 11: Congress decides to withhold money for at least two months after the Navy 
justifies the project to the Hill  
June 19: Proposals submitted by EDS, CSC, IBM and General Dynamics  
June 30: NMCI report to Congress 
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July 21: Questions from Congress postpones award until Sept. 1  
Sep. 01: Award delayed again for more questions  
Oct. 02: Award postponed again 
Oct. 06: EDS wins contract 
2001  
Feb.: EDS takes responsibility for 28,250 seats 
Mar.: An additional 13,985 seats added to the contract, giving EDS responsibility for 
42,235 at 26 Navy facilities 
July 9: First network center in Norfolk opens; Sen. John Warner, R-Va., questions 
commercial testing of NMCI  
Aug. 2: House Armed Services Committee proposes Marines not be part of NMCI. 
Proposal later dropped  
Aug. 6: Second network center in San Diego opens 
Aug. 28: Navy and Department of Defense settle dispute over how to test NMCI 
Sept. 7: First sailor logs on 
Sept. 25: Contract modification lowers fiscal 2002 payment to EDS to $600 million from 
$728 million; Congress requests more monitoring 
Sept.: 310 of 3,100 NMCI contract employees laid off by EDS because of slow rollout of 
the system 
Oct. 18: Naval Reserve Air Facility-Washington with 400 seats becomes first facility to 
exclusively use NMCI 
Nov.: Rollout begins for 3,500 seats at the Naval Air Station in Lemoore, Calif., and for 
1,000 seats at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station in Maryland  
December: Phase 3 testing and evaluation begins 
(www.washingtontechnology.com (Timeline of NMCI in the startup of the program) 
accessed January 2004) 
            2002  
January: Navy begins search for NMCI leader. Rear Admiral Charles Munns, U.S. 
Navy, is appointed NMCI director  
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March-May: Testing Phase completed, triggering order but not transitioning for 100,000 
additional seats. 
June: NNSOC is created. 
August: Start of monitoring the level of SLAs. Congress imposes a cap of 60,000 seats 
until EDS reached more of its service level agreements 
August: Testing of the operation of the enterprise management system for the SLA level. 
October: Testing completed, announcement of mixed results. 
October: Expansion of the baseline timeframe is agreed between DoN and EDS. 
December: Analysis of the measurements indicates EDS is close to reaching the SLAs 
2. Conclusions for the NMCI Start-Up  
The NMCI project has been plagued by off-track progress from the very 
beginning. During the first year of the contract, NMCI leaders faced issues ranging from 
how to handle thousands of old legacy applications to questions about how the Pentagon 
will oversee the program. Nothing similar in nature and magnitude had ever before been 
attempted: the reduction of hundreds of disparate networks across the globe and tens of 
thousands of legacy applications into one single, integrated and secure intranet 
architecture. Such change on a massive scale has fueled infighting and charges of 
mismanagement. The potential long term results, in terms of cost avoidance, increased 
security, interoperability and advanced capability, were considered to outweight the near 
term discomfort. Therefore, based on the idea “better late than never”, the decision for a 
revised timetable based on “event-driven” facts was mutually agreed to provide a more 
feasible solution for the NMCI implementation. 
The introduction of a rigorous testing process and the move from a time-based to 
an event-based schedule reassured many on Capitol Hill, and when a program manager 
was named, communication with Congress and oversight of NMCI within the Navy 
improved further, therefore turning Congress into an open supporter of the NMCI effort. 
The Navy's decision to bring a two-star admiral in to run the program indicated its 
commitment to ensuring that the required change would take place. The Navy plans 
during the year 2002 were to complete testing of the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet by the 
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end of April and receive permission from the DoD to add 100,000 more seats to the 
program. (www.washingtontechnology.com (NMCI testing Moves Forward), accessed 
February 2004)  Again, the target date was lost but after successful completion of testing 
that involved checking to see if NMCI was secure, reliable and compatible with other 
defense systems and whether service-level agreements were met the future started to look 
more prosperous.  
A managed services contract requires that the customer focus on the results 
provided by the contractor and give up some or all of the decision making involved with 
implementing those services. Because of this, it is imperative that the customer has the 
following in place, preferably well in advance of awarding the managed services 
contract: (www.belarc.com (IT as a Utility), accessed February 2004) 
• An accurate and complete inventory of existing computer hardware, 
software and users. That element was totally neglected by DoN and left 
until the contract had been awarded and resulted in unpleasant surprises, 
i.e. the estimated number of legacy and quarantined applications that had 
negative impact on the implementation progress. EDS also attributed the 
technical delays to the extremely large number of legacy applications 
discovered, many of which should be installed on kiosks outside of the 
intranet because they failed the security testing or do not run on Windows 
2000.  
• Realistic goals and objectives. The setting of goals and objectives is what 
most customers focus on, however without an accurate, complete and up-
to-date baseline, these goals can be unrealistic from the start. The timeline 
involved with NMCI was over-optimistic again, with a negative impact in 
the Congress’ confidence in the program and the Navy’s workforce morale 
without a concrete change management plan in place. On the other hand, 
the interaction between DoN representatives, industry experts and end –
user groups made possible a realistic determination of SLAs that are the 
foundation of the NMCI contract. 
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• An independent performance measurement and review process. The 
issue is that the service provider supplies IT infrastructure and services 
and then sends the customer a bill. However, the customer has no 
independent method of auditing the level of services, systems, software, 
and networks actually provided. The solution of hiring independent parties 
to do the NMCI testing along with auditing activity by the appropriate 
DoD agencies was the optimal solution to ensure the NMCI would remain 
on high standards and the outside pressure would cause the contractor “to 
cut corners”. 
IT-21 implementation was the initial step towards shipboard open 
communications. Once fully in place, it is expected to enable war-fighters to share 
classified and unclassified tactical and non-tactical information through a single network 
interface. This would shorten time lines and increase combat power. However, this 
capability will probably increase the demands on the shore information technology 
infrastructure and create a “bandwidth” burden. We are never going to be able to provide 
enough bandwidth to cover the demands of the GIG, so the alternative solution might be 
to manage more efficiently the quality of service (QoS) and prioritize the flow of 
information. Providing an integrated computing infrastructure that allows the authorized 
end user to communicate seamlessly across the DoN enterprise is a priority.  Therefore, it 
is critical that computing devices utilize the same communication protocols and have 
access to the bandwidth needed to facilitate prompt communication and collaboration. 
 One goal of the NMCI is to meet this demand by making available bandwidth 
“on demand”. In conjunction with IT-21, deployed forces will have readily available 
access to maintenance, logistics, medical and personnel data that resides within the 
supporting ashore establishments. NMCI could facilitate tele-maintenance by allowing 
deployed personnel to address a problem on a ship via on-line communication with 
technical experts ashore, therefore allowing less-experience personnel onboard-deployed 
units to deal with far more complex issues than they are qualified to. In the medical 
arena, personnel who come across complex situations will have the support of more 
experienced medical personnel within installations ashore. Web-based collaborative tools 
could be used to ensure ease of communications and interactions with the various 
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echelons of command. This collaborative environment would facilitate a worldwide 
interactive dialogue and by offering commanders the ability to share knowledge, not just 
data, it could significantly improve decision-making.  
C. ENDNOTES 
1. The Virginia based MSD Company had a supporting role on the EDS 
Product Assurance team and the testing included network WAN/LAN/server 
performance, information assurance testing and customer support process verification. 
Using hardware and software test tools the company technicians measured voice, video, 
data, and imagery networks’ fidelity and performance. The focus was to deliver a 
complete understanding of traffic’s effect on system latency, response time, throughput, 
and jitter.  
 
Figure 22: The Initial Testing of NMCI, from www.msdinc.com (NMCI Initial Testing), 
accessed February 2004 
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2. DoD has defined three types of architectures: operational, technical, and 
system. A technical architecture is a set of rules or "building codes" that are used when a 
system engineer begins to design/specify a system. These rules consist primarily of a 
common set of standards/protocols to be used for sending and receiving information 
(information transfer standards such as Internet Protocol suite), for understanding the 
information (information content and format standards such as data elements, or image 
interpretation standards) and for processing that information. It also includes a common 
human-computer interface and "rules" for protecting the information (i.e., information 
system security standards). The JTA is a document that mandates the minimum set of 
standards and guidelines for the acquisition of all DoD systems that produce, use, or 
exchange information. The applicable mandated standards in the JTA are the starting set 
of standards for a system and additional standards may be used to meet requirements if 
they are not in conflict with standards mandated in the JTA. The JTA is mandatory to be 
used by anyone involved in the management, development, or acquisition of new or 
improved systems within DoD. (www.jta.disa.mil (Frequently Asked Questions Section), 
accessed February 2004) 
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. PROGRESS OF THE NMCI CONTRACT 
A draft report of the fiscal year 2003 Defense Appropriations bill cited inadequate 
testing methods and a failure to identify thousands of legacy systems as lingering 
concerns for the NMCI project. As the DoN moves closer to its new integrated network, 
there is a need to clean out thousands of old applications that either fail to meet the 
NMCI standard software configuration or do not meet the security requirements already 
established by the DoD. Concerns were also related to the overall budget of the program. 
1. Historical Context in the year 2003 
The most appropriate authority to provide the recent numbers related with the 
implementation progress of NMCI is the NMCI Director himself: 
 
Figure 23: Progress of NMCI, from Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, Director of NMCI, 
NMCI Progress Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium 17 June 2003 
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The implementation process consists of 360,000 seats being moved into the 
NMCI in three stages. The first step is the official order by the Navy for a specific 
number of seats. The next milestone is when the Information Strike Force (ISF) assumes 
responsibility for the site (AOR). The final step is the seat cutover. The term “cutover” 
describes the point at which NMCI network users each receive a new desktop computer, 
operating system and software, and are connected to the full network services of the new 
intranet, including access to the legacy applications that resided on their previous 
workstations. The ISF, the industry team working on NMCI under the lead of EDS, in 
late 2002 had assumed responsibility for only 60,000 seats, out of the total goal of seats. 
Congress and the DoD had capped the size of the network while testing and evaluations 
were done, but in the end analysis of the results from four months of testing and EDS’ 
demonstrated ability to meet Service Level Agreements on the 20,000 pilot seats clearly 
removed all the barriers and NMCI was ready to move to the next level. 
The Pentagon gave to DoN the “go-ahead” to move as many as 310,000 Navy and 
Marine Corps IT users to the newly built network in the beginning of the year 2003.  The 
decision came after months of operational testing that was required by Congress before it 
would allow DoN to proceed beyond the 60,000 user cap that it imposed after concerns 
surfaced about the program's technical feasibility and cost. With the successful 
completion of the testing phase, the Navy received approval to proceed with all of the 
160,000 seats that had already been approved and to order an additional 150,000 seats. 
The official report at the end of the testing phase by the director of NMCI concluded:  
The results from four months of testing clearly demonstrated that the 
NMCI is ready to move to the next level 
Rear Admiral Charles L. Munns, U.S.N., Director of Navy Marine Corps Intranet. 
However, the “go-ahead” decision, at the beginning of 2003, did not mean that the 
program had finally achieved a satisfactory seat delivery pace. During the 2nd quarter of 
2003, progress was made but the cutover numbers were not adequate enough and there 
was still a long way towards the end state. The situation could be summarized as:  
• Number Sites Active – 300 
• Seats in AOR – 210,000 
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• Seats Cutover – Less than 80,000 
• Significant number of dual desktops in place (24% of total- Too High) 
• Facilities in place and Capacity:      
o 3 Network Operations Centers (Only two fully operational) 
o 2 Help Desks (With minimal “hands on” experience) 
o  24 Server Farms (Unclassified)- 263 Terabyte 
o 7 Server Farms (Classified)- 41 Terabyte 
With a simple comparison with the pre-planned end state, the implementation pace 
appeared again sluggish.  
 
Figure 24: NMCI End-State 
 
Figure 25: Cumulative Seat Implementation after the 2nd Quarter of the Year 2003 
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Figure 26: NMCI Progress and Main Concerns, from EDS Profits Review for the Year 
2003 
But EDS revised the Enterprise Deployment Rollout Plan (EDPP) at the time in 
place and accelerated the deployment. As of the 2003 fall, the ISF had responsibility for 
approximately 300,000 seats, with more than 107,000 seats moved to the cutover stage. 
Three network operation centers are currently fully operational in San Diego; Oahu, 
Hawaii; and Norfolk, Virginia. An additional network operations center also is in the 
process of being set up at the U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, therefore 
completing the required numbers of NOCs and indicating progress within the USMC’s 
portion of NMCI that had been put on hold by Congress until the completion of the first 
increment of the Intranet’s tests. Help desks are in place in Norfolk and San Diego, with 
complete functionality and automated tools are deployed to increase performance. The 
current number of Navy and Marine Corps seats that are now under ISF control has 
improved significantly. 
Snapshot 27 FEB 04
Seats in AOR 303,369
Seats Cut Over 160,175 
Table 4: Current NMCI Implementation Numbers, from www.nmci.navy.mil (NMCI 
Now), accessed February 2004 
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Figure 27: Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) within the Seat Management Framework, 
from the BCA for the NMCI, p.23 
The NMCI approach of a single private sector entity providing IT 
services under a long-term commercial seat management contract is a 
good business decision compared to the way Naval IT requirements are 
currently provided. In summary, considering all the dimensions of 
providing the Navy and Marine Corps war-fighters an optimal IT 
infrastructure and supporting network, there are more risks, uncertainties 
and hazards inherent in continuing to do business as usual, versus 
supporting basic IT services via NMCI. 
Conclusion, included in the Bussiness Case Analysis for the NMCI. 
DoN has decided that the requirements of NMCI could be provided most 
efficiently and effectively by a single private-sector vendor providing such IT capabilities 
as a service under a “seat management" contract. These type of contracts, used widely in 
the commercial sector, are long-term service contracts under which all required 
enterprise-wide IT capabilities, including all required infrastructure, are provided and 
managed by a single contractor. The customer is charged a fixed price per user (“seat”) 
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for each applicable period (e.g. monthly) throughout the life of the contract, provided that 
the contractor satisfies certain established service levels in specified performance areas.  
The NMCI contract is in keeping with the current federal government business 
trend of assigning accountability for various IT services to one vendor. The service-level 
agreements (SLAs) enables DoN to transition from a government-owned and -operated 
environment to a purchased-service environment in which the contractor provides for the 
daily operational task of maintaining a robust IT infrastructure. The SLA is a contracting 
tool keyed to a client's service performance expectations. This means that the client can 
evaluate the performance of the contractor and the services the contractor is providing. 
Meeting or beating the customer’s expectations will earn the contractor a financial 
reward; failing to meet expectations results in the contractor earning less money for that 
phase of implementation.  
 
Figure 28: Buying a “Seat” with the NMCI Contract 
The NMCI is acquired as a performance-based, enterprise-wide services contract 
that incorporates future strategic computing and communications capability that is 
managed like a utility. Service will be paid for, as it is delivered, similar to the concept of 
telephone utility service that is currently used in the commercial U.S. market. The 
customer (DoN) chooses from a list of basic and additional or “premium” services and 
pays for that level of service required or desired. Rather than treating information systems 
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as products that must be developed, maintained and upgraded in house, the Navy is 
“utilizing” commercial experts to provide the equipment, training, expertise and support 
as a service package for a set cost per user.  
The NMCI contractor must support a mix of large, medium, and small sized 
activities with dissimilar business functions. To make this task feasible, the contractor is 
expected to leverage economies of scale by developing standardized hardware and 
software platforms, as well as consolidating services within the same geographical 
location. Each computer that is connected in the NMCI is described under the term 
“seat”, while users have the ability to access the network from any type of seat available 
to them and not just from their “private” desktop. 
 
Figure 29: CLINs establishing the description of “Seats”, from the first version of the 
NMCI contract 
NMCI is by far the largest seat-management contract, and it includes not only the 
introduction of seats but also the supporting infrastructure on the bases and all the 
connectivity between and among any type of Naval installation ashore. Consolidating 
network management functions under the network operations centers (NOCs), aims to 
allow better management and utilization of security resources, configuration management 
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and network performance monitoring capabilities.  Service desk functions will also be 
centralized, to provide more efficient “one-stop” support to end-users. In other words, 
this is an end-to-end, total service being ordered by the DoN.  
1. Hardware Performance and Upgrades 
 
Figure 30: Seat Division within the NMCI Contract 
Performance of the hardware used is correlated with the importance of the 
functionality required and mission supported by the end user. Dell Company is providing 
complete IT systems for NMCI according to the above technology insertion matrix in 
order to ensure adequate technology refresh. Dell is also partly responsible for 
installation accuracy. The ISF provides Dell with a load set to install on each machine 
equipped with Microsoft Windows 2000 and Office 2000. When the systems arrive at the 
Navy and Marine Corps sites, they are pre-configured and NMCI-certified. Upgrades, 
modernization, and technology refreshment will occur over the NMCI contract life cycle. 
2. Software 
Standardized operating system (OS) and application packages are supported by 
NMCI through the use of COTS products to every possible extend, although some 
modification to the standard application packages may be necessary depending upon 
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unique DoN requirements. Software platforms are required to be within one year of the 
current service pack or major release. Client applications include e-mail capability, 
NIPRNet/Internet connectivity, database functions, spreadsheets, graphics and word 
processing functions, anti-virus software, and calendar applications.  
Additionally, the number and functions of servers should also be consolidated, 
eliminating redundant platforms in order to optimize maintenance and support processes 
and provide the high level of service as designated by the SLAs. The application servers 
must be fully integrated with the workstation environment and processes facilitating 
administrative activity, such as automated software distribution, virus inoculation, 
detection and repair, should be present. Network management capabilities should include 
configuration and change management, inventory management and acquisition tools, 
centralized user account management, security functions, life cycle management, backup 
and disaster recovery capabilities and the ability to remotely access end user machines 
from network management stations.    
Features Benefits Aim 
Customizable 
Help and Alerts 
Desktop administrator 
customizes online help based on 
prior history of help desk 
support calls. 




Automatically detects and 
repairs errors without a user 
even knowing about them. 
Decreases end-user downtime and 
eliminates need to call help desk. 
Reduced peer-to-peer support. 
Install-on-Demand Improves desktop manageability Fewer custom installations decrease 
deployment costs. Reduced help desk 




Customizable and intelligent 
user interface simplifies daily 
tasks. 
Easier completion of routine daily 
tasks 
Table 5: Administrator’s Software and Capabilities, from the BCA for the NMCI, p. 75 
In Table C, in Appendix C there is the revision history of the software associated 
with the NMCI implementation. The standardized software package that is currently in 






Table 6: Contents of the “Gold Disk”, from www.nmci-isf.com (Gold Disk Contents), 
updated on the 15th of December 2003, accessed February 2004 
Because this thesis will provide recommendations for the information security 
(INFOSEC) and information assurance (IA) policies [Note 1] related to NMCI in the 
chapters that follow, a detailed description of security related software will be provided in 
this section. Symantec Corp. has been awarded a contract from EDS to help secure NMCI 
in the early years of the contract, in March 2001. Under terms of the agreement, 
Symantec provides a significant portion of the security components including firewall, 
virus protection, content filtering, vulnerability assessment, and intrusion detection 
solutions to safeguard the IT services provided. Under a subcontract from EDS, Raytheon 
is responsible for the overall network security and information assurance of the network. 
In implementing NMCI, the full complement of Symantec security solutions is utilized. 
With Norton AntiVirus at each desktop, NMCI has automatic protection against viruses 
and other malicious code as well as centralized anti-virus policy management to facilitate 
administration and enhance security.  
Symantec Intruder Alert version 3.6 is a host-based, real-time intrusion 
monitoring system built with the purpose to detect unauthorized activity and security 
breaches and respond automatically, if the case arises. It includes specialized software 
agents that support server platforms running Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 
Enterprise Edition and can be configured to monitor Web or database applications 
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running on servers. If Intruder Alert detects a threat, it will sound an alarm and initiate 
countermeasures according to the pre-established security policies. From a central 
console, administrators can create, update, and deploy policies and securely collect and 
archive audit logs for incident analysis. As a complement to firewalls and other access 
controls, Intruder Alert enables the development of precautionary security policies that 
prevent expert hackers or authorized users with malicious intent from misusing systems, 
applications, and data. The focus is on: (www.symandec.com (Intruder Alert), accessed 
February 2004) 
• Monitoring systems and networks in real time in order to detect 
and prevent unauthorized activity  
• Enabling the creation of customizable intrusion detection policies 
and responses  
• Enforcing policy with the automatic deployment of new policies 
and updated detection signatures  
• Delivering network-wide responses to security breaches from a 
central management console  
• Providing audit data for incident analyses and generating graphical 
reports for both host and network intrusion detection activity  
• Complementing firewalls and other access control systems with no 
impact on network performance 
Intruder Alert has the aim to enhance the control over systems with policy-based 
management that determines which systems and activities to monitor and what actions to 
take, as well as with real-time intrusion detection reports for both host and network 
components. Administrative wizards perform many routine tasks and silent installation 
and remote tune-up capabilities make it easy to deploy and maintain the system. Intrude 
Alert ingrates with the Symantec Enterprise Security Manager™ (ESM). 
 Symantec ESM is an automation tool for the discovery of security vulnerabilities 
and deviations of the security policy in mission critical e-business applications and 
servers across the whole enterprise from a single location. It provides enterprise-class 
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tools that allow administrators to create security baselines for every system on the 
network and measure performance against those baselines to ensure that devices are 
properly configured and being used in accordance with policies. With the appropriate 
tools, administrators can quickly and cost effectively create and manage online security 
policies and user-defined security domains, identify systems that are not in compliance, 
and correct faulty security settings on systems at any location to bring them back into 
compliance.  
Because Symantec Enterprise Security Manager integrates with the Symantec 
Security Management System, it can also leverage advanced management capabilities 
that provide improved overall security posture. Within the framework of the Symantec 
Security Management System, policy compliance data collected and analyzed by ESM 
can be correlated with security event data from a multitude of sources, including 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and vulnerability assessment products. And, the 
central logging, alerting, and reporting functions of the Symantec Security Management 
System can be combined with the correlation, risk prioritization, and management 
capabilities of Symantec™ Incident Manager to build a holistic, proactive security 
system. This enables organizations to respond rapidly to incidents, contain and eradicate 
threats faster, and utilize the full potential of their security systems. Key features include: 
(www.symantec.com (Enterprise security Products), accessed February 2004) 
• Large number of specific security checks to help ensure that mission-
critical information systems comply with an organization's security 
policies.  
• Easy retrieval and deployment of security updates with Live Update 
™technology.  
• Integration with other Symantec Security Management System products to 
ensure a more holistic understanding of security risks and priorities.  
• Measurement and reporting on compliance with industry standards and 
government regulations.  
• Wide platform and application coverage.  
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• Customizable security policy support. 
• Focuses on proactive security to ensure the maintenance of business 
operations. 
3. Services Provided 
The NMCI offers the required IT services under the framework of a single 
network, which is easier to manage and more secure, and enables military personnel to 
focus on their defense mission rather than information technology acquisition and 
support. A breakdown of the current data seat services within NMCI is shown in Figure 
31: 
 
Figure 31: Breakdown of Data Seat Services 
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The domain of NMCI’s “Basic Services” includes the following: 
• Security services (firewalls, intrusion detection, encryption) 
• WAN access (DISN, Commercial WAN, internet) 
• Infrastructure (Voice video, & data transport) 
• Joint and industry network interoperability 
• Pier services (connectivity, NOC/JFTOC interface) 
• Enterprise functions (Help Desk/Tech support) 
• Network management services 
• Desktop hardware (standard, high-end, and laptop) 
• Desktop software (standard software suite) 
• Organizational messaging (AUTODIN, Defense Message System (DMS)) 
• Training 
• Directory services 
• E-mail 
• Remote telephone access 
• Domain name service 
• Help Desk/Tech support 
• LAN (building LANs) 
• System management services 
• Telephony – Switched telephone networks 
• Telephony to the desktop 
(Navy Marine Corps Intranet Site Deployment Guide Version 1.2, 07 March 
2003, p. 40) 
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C. NMCI SECURITY AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE POLICIES  
The NMCI security policy supports the five fundamental information assurance 
elements (confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and non-repudiation) and 
establishes how the NMCI will manage, protect, and distribute sensitive information. The 
directive case (DC) security policy statements are derived from the appropriate DoD and 
DoN IT directives and instructions to which the NMCI must adhere by virtue of its 
existence as a DoN information system.  
 
Figure 32: NMCI Security Components and Interactions 
NMCI complies with DISN security policy and DISA requirements for 
connection to the SIPRNET. Security services provided for/within the NMCI implement 
Computer Network Defense (CND) initiatives such as Information Operations Condition 
(INFOCON) directives and Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA) notices, 
and effort is made to integrate within the existing DoD and remaining of DoN CND 
infrastructure. Preference is given to COTS IA and IA-enabled IT products evaluated and 
validated, as appropriate, in accordance with one of the following: 
• The International Common Criteria for Information Security Technology 
Evaluation Mutual Recognition Arrangement 
• The National Security Agency (NSA)/National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) 
Evaluation and Validation Program  
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• The NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) validation 
program 
(NMCI Contract N00024-00-D-6000, (Conformed Contract P00080), Attachment 5, p.7) 
1.  A Brief Introduction into Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI is a set of standards for applications that use encryption and is often called 
trust hierarchy. It is a system of digital certificates, Certificate Authorities, and other 
registration authorities that verify and authenticate the validity of each party involved in a 
Web transaction. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the term generally used to describe 
the laws, policies, standards, and software that regulate or manipulate digital certificates 
and public and private keys.  
 
Figure 33: PKI Definition 
 
Figure 34: Private and Public Keys 
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The DoD introduced PKI with the following capabilities in mind: 
• Secure Unclassified E-mail (Sign, Encrypt and Decrypt) using digital 
certificates. 
• Certificate-Based client-server “Mutual” Authentication 
• Certificate-Based Authentication to Unclassified Web Applications 
• Secure Encrypted Communications/Transactions Between Client and Web 
Servers Using SSL 
• Certificate-Based Network Logon 
The digital certificate is simply an attachment to an electronic message used for 
security purposes. The most common use of the certificate is to verify that a user sending 
a message is who he or she claims to be, and to provide the receiver with the means to 
encode a reply. An individual wishing to send an encrypted message applies for a digital 
certificate from a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues an encrypted digital 
certificate containing the applicant's public key and a variety of other identification 
information. The CA makes its own public key readily available through print publicity 
or more commonly on the Internet. 
 
Figure 35: PKI Architecture 
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The recipient of an encrypted message uses the CA's public key to decode the 
digital certificate attached to the message, verifies it as issued by the CA and then obtains 
the sender's public key and identification information held within the certificate. With 
this information, the recipient can send an encrypted reply. The most widely used 
standard for digital certificates is X.509. 
 
Figure 36: Public Key Cryptography 
Within the NMCI, a PKI certificate is an electronic “document” officially linking 
a user’s identity with his/her Public key. There are three types of PKI certificates: 
• Identity: Digitally sign documents or electronic forms. Also used to 
authenticate the user to specific applications. 
• E-mail Signature: Digitally sign e-mails 
• E-mail Encryption: Digitally encrypt e-mail messages 
(NMCI Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) User Guide, 2nd July 2003, p. 2) 
The driver for the approach to implement DoN wide infrastructure to support PKI 
is to enhance the security posture of NMCI through the use of the already PKI posture 
established by DoD to: 
• Enable end user cryptographic logon to NMCI 
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• Enable client authentication to private DoD websites  
• Digitally sign all e-mail messages originated from Mission Assurance 
Category (MAC) I and MAC II systems, as well as all e-mail messages 
where the sender or recipient requires data integrity and/or non-
repudiation.  
• Encrypt Private and/or Sensitive But Unclassified e-mail. 
2. Understanding Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a commonly used protocol for managing the 
security of a message transmission on the Internet. [Note 2] SSL uses a program layer 
located between the Internet's Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Transport Control 
Protocol (TCP) layers. SSL is included as part of both the Microsoft and Netscape 
browsers and most Web server products. Developed by Netscape, SSL also gained the 
support of Microsoft and other Internet client/server developers as well and became the 
de facto standard until evolving into Transport Layer Security. The “sockets” part of the 
term refers to the sockets method of passing data back and forth between a client and a 
server program in a network or between program layers in the same computer. SSL uses 
the public-and-private key encryption system from RSA, which also includes the use of a 
digital certificate. (www.Searchsecurity.com (SSL Definition), accessed February 2004) 
 
Figure 37: How SSL Works, from the Netscape Corp.  
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3. Defense in Depth Strategy 
NMCI employs a defense-in-depth (DiD) strategy to mitigate the risk associated 
with a single point of failure. Available protection technologies are employed in a layered 
system of defenses. To this end, attacks directed against systems within NMCI's defined 
network boundaries are met by a series of protection mechanisms including, but not 
limited to, encryption, intrusion detection systems, access control, user identification and 
authentication, malicious content detection, audit, physical and environmental controls. 
Use of these mechanisms is intended to mitigate inherent system vulnerabilities and 
counter potential threats. The number and type of defense mechanisms used in each 
boundary layer is a consequence of the protective qualities of the device and the assigned 
value of the information within the protected enclave.  
Content security-checking mechanisms to scan for malicious code are 
implemented via the NMCI approach for all connecting networks, systems and 
subsystems. All NMCI information systems are monitored to detect, isolate, and react to 
intrusions, disruptions or denials of services, or other incidents that threaten the security 
of the network. NMCI shall follows an enterprise-wide IA architecture that implements a 
DiD approach to incorporate multiple protection schemes at different levels to establish 
and maintain an overall acceptable IA posture across the NMCI.  
These boundaries are: 
• Boundary 1: Logical Boundary between NMCI and External Networks. 
• Boundary 2: Logical Boundary between NMCI and Communities of 
Interest (COIs). These COIs could be at Metropolitan Area Network 
(MAN)/Base Area Network (BAN)/Local Area Network (LAN) level, or 
between different organizations or   functional groups. 
• Boundary 3: Logical Boundary between COIs and Host level I. 
• Boundary 4: Final Layer of Defense: Application/Host Level. 
Corresponding to the discussion of boundaries within the NMCI is a distinction of 
layers of defense implemented as part of DiD strategy. 
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• Layer 0: Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Communication between the NMCI 
and public networks that is not afforded the same degree of protection 
provided by an integrated network security suite. 
• Layer 1: External boundary level protection. Communication provided 
between the NMCI and external networks such as NIPRNet/INTERNET 
or SIPRNet. 
• Layer 2: Communication internal to the NMCI. 
• Layer 3: Communication within COIs in the NMCI without the use of a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
• Layer 4: Communication within COIs in the NMCI with the use of VPN 
• Layer 5: Application/Host Level 
 
Figure 38: NMCI Layered Defense, from the NMCI Contract N00024-00-D-6000, 
(Conformed Contract P00080), Attachment 5, p.6) 
Because government and especially military networks pose an attractive target 
and are attacked constantly, the NMCI must be fully prepared to respond. Under the 
NMCI and along with the increased security approach, DoN will have total visibility of 
the operational network for both setting strong procedures to detect, respond and guard 
against outside attack and ensuring information assurance for every user. 
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D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS FOR THE CURRENT STAGE OF THE 
NMCI IMPLEMENTATION 
1. The Current Progress of Seats Delivered 
Now entering its fourth year of implementation, the NMCI program has 
experienced a rather difficult start and unexpected squalls in its adaptation of commercial 
processes. The obvious conclusion from the figures related with the NMCI 
implementation is that the total numbers of seats that have achieve the “cut-over” under 
the NMCI environment up to now, is still not enough to deliver the full NMCI promise to 
the end-users. 
The financial house of experts “Morgan Stanley” on October 2003 issued a report 
on the NMCI progress- EDS’s profitability and the conclusions related to the NMCI 
effort could be described only as bad. According to the 23-page report, the analysts gave 
the company less than a 1 percent probability of meeting current [fourth-quarter fiscal 
2003 and first-quarter fiscal 2004] accumulated cutover seat targets, given current 
cutover seat rates averaging 290 per day [during the past nine months], compared with 
1,500 seats per day required to achieve its stated objectives and profitability. The EDS 
Corp. attributed the loss of profits to the decline in the average seat price based on the 
types of seats ordered and expected to be ordered by the DoN, as well as a reduced period 
of time in which to generate seat revenue due to deployment delays and associated 
incremental estimated operating costs. However, the report concluded that the year 2004 
could be a pivotal year for the company and the project, as EDS will have ample 
opportunity to improve NMCI's free cash flow generation. 
On the good news front, the program is now more mature with the entire 
requirements fully understood and crystallized by the client. The team supervising the 
implementation effort has now enough experience with the complex nature of the 
problems involved and the spiral approach for seats deployment that is now in place 
facilitates solving of technical issues in a more coordinated manner than the previous 
linear approach. Additionally, the EDS-ISF team has been flexible and always found 
ways to move around technical difficulties. More important is that within the year 2004 
DoN is expecting to complete the operational evaluation of the network and enjoy the full 
technical capability and IT support by the ISF. 
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The NMCI progress is obviously slower than we had anticipated. Going 
forward what we intend to do is separate the reporting on the Navy 
contract from the rest of our operations to give everybody a much cleaner 
picture of the base business, as well as a lot of transparency on the Navy 
contract itself. 
Michael Jordan, EDS president and chief executive, commenting the year 
2003 economic results of EDS Corp 
EDS officials announced on the 5th of February 2004 that they would separate the 
company's reporting on its earnings and its reporting on its DoN related business, because 
the company executives feel that losses caused by NMCI aren't reflective of the 
company's overall performance. EDS had to revise the NMCI rollout plan in midstream 
because the company was spending a lot of money, time and effort to roll out far fewer 
seats than it had anticipated. The revised deployment schedule, according to Jordan, 
requires that EDS will write down deferred construct costs of $559 million. 
 
Figure 39: Current State of NMCI Seats, Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, U.S. Navy, NMCI 
Director, NMCI Briefing, at the SPAWAR Industry Day, San Diego-USA, 23rd October 
2003 
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a. The NMCI Budget 
In order to evaluate better the potential cost of NMCI against a 
comparable baseline, the Department has performed a Business Case Analysis (BCA). 
The “as-is” [Note 3] environment identified 335,000 current “seats” (as of FY 1999) 
throughout the DON and an average annual cost of $4,582 per seat. That implied a 
funded base of support for NMCI-like IT requirements of at least $1.5 billion annually. 
The fiscal 2003 budget called for $646 million, based on adjustment through the “reward-
penalty” model of the SLAs. 
 
Table 7: The NMCI Budget Summary, from the NMCI Report to the Congress, p. A-3  
The Pentagon has given approval to the DoN to seek funding of $1.1 
billion for the Navy Marine Corps Intranet in the fiscal 2004 budget, a markup of nearly 
$500 million from the fiscal 2003 budget. President Bush signed on the 24th of 
November 2003 the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2004, authorizing the 
DoD budget for the current fiscal year. However, the federal government's General 
Accounting Office (GAO) said in late December 2003 that sloppy accounting practices 
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by the DoD led to a $1.6 billion discrepancy between two keys IT budget reports for 
fiscal 2004. (www.computerworld.com (GAO says inaccuracies in 2004 Pentagon IT 
budget), accessed February 2004) Topping the list of projects with inconsistent budget 
figures was the NMCI program. GAO determined that about 95% of the total dollar 
difference between IT budget requests from the DoN ($581M) could be attributed to the 
NMCI initiative. The GAO attributed the budget discrepancies to what it called 
“insufficient management attention” as well as ambiguities in the Defense Department's 
internal regulatory processes, including those for ensuring consistency between reports. 
For those who are not convinced about the NMCI initiative value, conclusions like that is 
the perfect ammunition to strike back, because the program appears over budget.  
Major initiatives do not consistently use the same type of appropriations to 
fund the same activities. To fund the same types of activities, some DoD 
organizations used the research, development, test and evaluation 
appropriations, and others used the operation and maintenance 
appropriations. 
Conclusion, included in GAO’s Report Improvements Needed in the 
Reliability of Defense Budget Submission to the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives, December 2003. 
However, it should be noted that it is crystal clear from the public 
announcements made by EDS relating to the reduced stream of NMCI expected profits 
that the SLA model works in favor of the DoN. Additionally, the fact that there are still 
discrepancies on budgeting and accounting procedures after all those years of improving 
visibility of the accounting systems is a proof that DoN needs NMCI to improve the 
accuracy of its budgetary data and reporting, because this IT initiative will allow network 
and IT infrastructure costs to be listed as separate expenses, rather than lumped into 
command operating budgets. 
NMCI is a strategic approach that will enable the entire spectrum of DoN 
agencies to effectively communicate in the modern age. USN and USMC have 
recognized that intranets have become major communications tools for any type of 
activity in the 21st century and understood the value of a unified network organized and 
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managed at the Department/Enterprise level. NMCI has a proven Return On Investment  
(ROI) for the DoN and is expected to afford significant improvements in overall 
capability, connectivity, security and effectiveness of IT systems, benefits that are not 
possible to described through   financial termilogy or easily captured in a spreadsheet 
matrix. 
 
Figure 40: NMCI Savings and Other Bennefits, Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, U.S. Navy, 
NMCI Director, NMCI Briefing, at the SPAWAR Industry Day, San Diego-USA, 23rd 
October 2003 
b. The Legacy Issue is still Present 
In the year 2002 the main issue under concern was to cut back 100,000 
legacy applications to 30,000. After the initial start up, those 30,000 remaining 
applications underwent evaluation to determine which are mission critical and meet 
NMCI guidelines. Over time, DoN and ISF hope to reduce the legacy number to 
approximately 7,000 applications. Ultimately, the goal is to reduce the number of 
applications to around 2,000, but getting participants in numerous departments to agree to 
change their software tools is a very complex task. Mission-critical legacy applications 
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that do not meet security requirements have been a major sticking point, but the Navy and 
ISF have dealt with them by placing the seats in quarantine. Old applications in nearly 
one-quarter of the seats could not be transferred to new Windows 2000 machines, forcing 
EDS to install “dual desktops”, leaving sailors and Marines with two PCs on their desks.   
Legacy applications are not permitted onto the NMCI network either 
because of security risks or because they are incompatible with the standardized 
Windows 2000 environment. In 2003, the Navy issued stricter legacy application 
guidelines in order to trim down the number further. Under the directive, only 
applications identified as approved or allowed with restrictions by a functional area 
manager can be retained and allowed to run on NMCI. The tougher legacy application 
guidelines have caused some commands difficulty when their applications did not meet 
NMCI standards. (www.mit-kmi.com (NMCI: Now for the Networks), accessed February 
2004) 
Transitional firewalls in some places between the old Navy networks and 
NMCI have been installed in specific commands. The intent is to allow some 
applications, with appropriate security risk mitigation by NETWARCOM, to transmit in 
and out of NMCI that previously couldn't. But the long-term strategy is to reduce the 
number of applications and get those application servers inside the NMCI enclave. On the 
other hand, some 5,000 applications have already been certified on NMCI. 
By reducing the number of applications, it also reduces the time it takes to 
get applications NMCI certified, because there are fewer of them to 
certify. By the end of calendar year [2003], we anticipate EDS will operate 
everything in DoN. By mid-2004, we anticipate completely operating the 
NMCI. 
Captain Chris Christopher, U.S.N. staff director of the NMCI office 
Last year, DoN turned the legacy challenge into an opportunity. 
Cataloging applications enabled the Navy to assess and understand which commands had 
which applications. A group of managers was designated to examine the applications in 
23 functional areas such as logistics, personnel and administration. The managers 
scrutinized the list of applications and determined which to keep and which to delete. As 
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of the 1st of October 2003, only applications on the functional area managers’ (FAM) list 
are allowed on NMCI seats. 
c. Cultural Issue and Change Management 
Resistance to change was another challenge for the NMCI implementation 
effort. Changing the paradigm from computers as individual property to a point of service 
is a major shift, and it has been an issue that the ISF has had to address at every site but 
without any coordinated planning. DoN and the ISF have not done a good job of 
managing the cultural change piece, but at least they are now trying to get better. After 
experiencing early glitches to move users to the NMCI environment, the DoN concluded 
that additional training will help future users make a smooth transition to the Navy's 
enterprise network.  
The Navy formed a transition team last year to help commands switch 
from legacy systems to NMCI and to provide documents and resources to users to help 
them to get started and provide helpful hints on becoming a successful NMCI user. 
Training consists of briefings, introduction of related Web sites and information packets, 
but apparently not everyone is getting the training they need, according to the end users. 
Postings on the NMCI User Information Web page provide an on-line newsletter 
addressed to all users that keeps NMCI users up to date with upcoming changes to the 
NMCI environment and explains significant developments and events related with the 
NMCI implementation and operations. Additional recourses and tools include: 
• A briefing given to command chief information officers, 
information technology leaders and command leaders six months 
before the transition. The briefing includes a list of contacts, a 
master glossary of acronyms and a lengthy presentation on the 
network's ins and outs. 
• A subsequent briefing that takes place 60 to 90 days before the 
transition, again for the leaders and IT managers of a command.  
• End users can download a series of "Ready," "Set" and "Go" 
guides and visit the EDS’s special Web site about making the 
transition to NMCI, www.nmci-isf.com (User Information Main 
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Menu), accessed February 2004. These materials explain how 
users should prepare for NMCI prior to the installation of their 
NMCI workstation. 
• A variety of information and electronic guidance/advice provided 
in the above mentioned website supported by the EDS-ISF team. 
2.  Information Assurance (IA) within NMCI 
The overall strategy of defending the NMCI and the information it contains is 
articulated in the concept of information assurance (IA), which overlaps into the concept 
of computer network defense (CND), and also includes network availability and 
operational management. The NMCI network security policy is essentially a compilation 
of DoD and DoN information security policies. This ensures the new network's 
compliance and compatibility with existing and proposed DoD network architecture and 
operational procedures.  
The NMCI network security architecture must be capable of providing protection 
of the Intranet's information systems and information content. This includes the execution 
of IA mechanisms to implement these security services and the conduct of vulnerability 
assessments to validate the necessary controls is in place to satisfy NMCI information 
assurance requirements. Because NMCI provides services critical to accomplishment of 
the DoN mission, network design associated with information assurance is subject to 
strict compliance with DoD/DoN security policy, government approval of IA products 
and CND operations.The NMCI security policy supports all the fundamental information 
assurance elements and establishes how the NMCI manages, protects and distributes 
sensitive information. 
 The NMCI system features five principal information assurance or security 
properties:  
• Availability: Authorized users can properly access online information 
systems.  
• Integrity: Safeguard information or communications from modification by 
unauthorized users.  
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• Authentication: A degree of certainty or assurance that 
information/communications are provided by authorized sources.  
• Confidentiality: Only authorized individuals have access to sensitive 
information.  
• Non-repudiation: There is some proof of sending and receiving 
information/communications for tracking/documentation purposes. 
From the information security standpoint, the enforced uniform standards will 
probably reduce the number of available gateways that were vulnerable to cyber attacks 
in the previous IT environment. NMCI is intended to be one worldwide, configuration-
managed enterprise network that meets or exceeds all DoD standards for security and 
information assurance. NETWARCOM is the central operational authority responsible 
for coordinating all information technology, information operations, and space 
requirements and operations within the Navy. Establishment of NETWARCOM has 
better aligned the various staffs needed to support the concept of one naval network and 
to support that network's end-to-end operational management. 
The NMCI initiative, by rooting out vulnerabilities, is raising defenses. It is 
providing uniform security standards and training for naval personnel people before they 
use the network. The network operations centers control intranet traffic, and they can 
isolate the network if need be.  NMCI delivers significant value as an asset for the DoN at 
the enterprise level with important improvements in IA, by providing: 
• Public Key Infrastructure that is interoperable with the DoD’s PKI. 
Navy and Marine Corps commands have been authorized an extension 
until the 1st of April 2004 to achieve full compliance with the following 
DoD’s PKI milestones: 
o Client side authentication to DoD private web servers 
o Digitally signing all e-mail sent within DoD 
o PK-enable web applications in unclassified environments 
o PK-enable DoD unclassified networks for hardware token 
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o Certificate based access control 
o DoN industry partners obtain DoD approved PKI digital 
certificates or external certificate authority (ECA) PKI digital 
certificates 
• Strong Authentication: PKI Certificates are stored on a 
cryptographic smartcard (in almost every case, the DoD Common Access Card) 
that is required for network access, no matter of the point of entry. 
• Central Security Management: Certification & Accreditation plus 
real-time network operation status provided. 
• Incentives Performance on IA: DoN Teams will provide 
independent assessments of the security posture of the NMCI network. The NMCI 
vendor receives a monetary reward based on their performance on these 
assessments. Red teams, independent of the contractor, review network designs 
for vulnerabilities and periodically conduct simulated attacks. If they breach the 
network, the contractor could lose as much as $10 million a year.  
• Defense-in-Depth: Multiple protection technologies installed in a 
layered system of defenses. 
 
Figure 41: The NMCI Security Architecture. 
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E. ENDNOTES 
1. Information Security (INFOSEC) can be defined as the protection of 
information against unauthorized disclosure, transfer, modification, or destruction, 
whether accidental or intentional. Information Assurance (IA) activities are defined as 
information operations that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection and reaction capabilities. (Dorothy E. Denning (1999). Information 
Warfare and Security. Massachusetts: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., p. 40)  
2. SSL has recently been succeeded by Transport Layer Security (TLS), 
which is based on SSL. TLS is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the 
TLS Handshake Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security with 
some encryption method such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The TLS Record 
Protocol can also be used without encryption. The TLS Handshake Protocol allows the 
server and client to authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and 
cryptographic keys before data is exchanged. TLS and SSL are an integral part of most 
Web browsers (clients) and Web servers. If a Web site is on a server that supports SSL, 
SSL can be enabled and specific Web pages can be identified as requiring SSL access. By 
convention, URLs that require an SSL connection start with https instead of http. 
(www.Searchsecurity.com (SSL Definition), accessed February 2004) 
3. The purpose of the baseline (As-Is) study was to provide an assessment of 
assets and services in place within all installations at the time the BCA was conducted. 
Survey and extrapolation techniques were determined to be the best solution for 
estimating the DoN’s “as-is” baseline.  A sampling technique was implemented to gather 


































A.  THE WAY NMCI IS TESTED  
The DoN continues to try to identify the imperfections of NMCI and is currently 
in the process of conducting a complete operational evaluation of the intranet. The 
original plans from September of 2001 described a series of linear tests that resembled 
the “ship evaluation” approach. The network had at that time to pass specific tests before 
the next set of seats would be brought onboard. A critical task for the year 2004 is the 
successful completion of the evaluation of NMCI at the operational level. Unlike the 
original testing plans, the operational evaluation is not a "go, no-go" decision and the 
entire network will be rolled out. The focus of the new evaluation is to identify weak 
points and provide feedback to improve performance of the current environment.  
It is necessary to briefly examine the previous testing concepts related to the 
NMCI’s implementation. Management Systems Designers, Inc. (MSD) successful 
support for the NMCI Contractor’s Test and Evaluation (CTE) phase was the reason to be 
awarded a two year task to perform turning-up testing at all NMCI (large and major) 
command sites prior to production turn over, on the 8th of March 2002. Turning-up 
testing is a critical activity at the end of “Site Preparation” phase during the transition 
towards the NMCI and is a binding activity according to the NMCI contract prior to 
declare the specific site operational, in order to validate the architecture of the 
infrastructure built to support the operation of the Intranet. Typical activities within the 
tests included fact-finding, data discovery, function activity and task analysis, tool 
selection, development and employment. Finally, the conclusions were derived after an 
extensively detailed architecture analysis. To facilitate the testing activity, MSD has built 
an enterprise architecture development practice by applying the Chief Information 
Officers’ Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (CIO-FEAF) and DoD’s command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) frameworks, via selecting the specific components that best match DoN 
requirements. Feedback from end–users and modeling tools were used extensively to 
facilitate the design and development of the continuously adjusted testing procedures.  
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Testing was conducted at all seven layers of the open system interconnection 
(OSI) model and the network in question was stressed to its limits via a disciplined, pre-
configured approach. The performance test methods were based on traffic generation, 
interoperability confirmation and on-going network surveillance techniques. The 
approach used was to assess interoperability and the effects of various network 
components, applications, and operating systems’ changes on the network with a “holistic 
view”, by identifying the various interdependencies. 
 This specific structured approach allows network engineers to measure network 
performance, predict failure, and analyze recovery accurately. The goal was to provide 
the data to understand systems or network limitations and to identify the corrective action 
in a repetitive process, thus achieving high levels of network availability. The 
performance measurements should go beyond simply measuring point statistics. Trend 
analysis should be used extensively to identify potential impending problems and 
highlights areas that need improvement.  
 
Figure 42: The MSD Framework for the NMCI Turning–Up Testing, from 
www.msdinc.com, accessed February 2004 
MSD used the approach shown in figure 42 to support the first increment of 
NMCI evaluation activities, by developing a detailed test plan for the worldwide, base 
level and local area network testing, as well as key enterprise application tests such as 
directory services and e-mail latency. The plan involved identifying and developing an 
approach that is totally independent of the NMCI built-in network management system. It 
also required evaluating performance differences under varying conditions between 
different WAN carriers, identifying the necessary test tools and developing detailed 
testing procedures to conduct tests at the various NMCI operational sites.  
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A combined team, with the necessary DoN and EDS personnel was responsible to 
conduct the testing activities. An independent third party by specific DoD agencies 
ensured the validity of the results and the thorough analysis of the data collected, made 
possible the acceptance assessment that took place during the year 2002. At that time, the 
evaluation involved roughly 20,000 seats; this year there will be more than 100,000. The 
NMCI schedule for the operational evaluation activity established the beginning of the 
activities in early October 2003 and the delivery of conclusions around the 2nd quarter of 
2004. The main idea is to closely examine the deployment and operation of the network. 
Based on a similar concept with the previous tests and in order to ensure the validity of 
the methodology, this new “operational evaluation” will be conducted by a combination 
of independent testing teams. MSD has recently announced the completion of the 
WAN/LAN and Servers (Email, Newsgroup, Active Directory, Web, etc.) performance 
testing in support of the NMCI evaluation. 
B. EVALUATION OF NMCI PERFORMANCE  
NMCI supports the fulfillment of both strategic and operational requirements for 
the DoN. Analysis made in the BCA for the NMCI concluded that the pre-NMCI DoN IT 
environment only partially exhibited the desired levels of service in Network Operations 
and Maintenance, Interoperability and Security/Information Assurance.  Achieving the 
service levels specified in the NMCI contract aims to resolve these deficiencies. The 
NMCI’s Performance Measurement Plan is the approach used to ensure that key outcome 
measures are identified and collected in order to facilitate the evaluation of the intranet’s 
performance and determine whether NMCI is supporting the kinds of improvements it 
was designed to accomplish. In order to capture and analyze the full picture of the 
network and whether the capabilities this IT platform offers to the DoN enterprise are 
taken fully advantage by the users or not, the following strategic performance 
measurement categories are used:  
• Interoperability 
• Security and Information Assurance 
• Service Efficiency 
• Customer Satisfaction 
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• Work Force Capabilities 
• Process Improvement 
• Operational Performance 
The first two measures, interoperability and security and information assurance, 
relate to the NMCI’s supporting role of the DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG). The 
second pair of measures, service efficiency and customer satisfaction, measure the 
immediate impact of the intranet on the whole organization. By measuring the services 
provided, the total cost of providing services and making the customer (end-user) a key 
part of the process, the direct impact of NMCI can be readily assessed. The last three 
areas of measurement, assure that the intranet will be an integrated portion of the Navy 
and Marine Corps strategic vision, supporting the principles of using information 
technology (IT) to support people, focusing on the value of technology and using IT as a 
force multiplier. (NMCI Report to Congress, 30 June 2000, p. J-5-1) 
To facilitate the establishment of performance criteria, the combination of 
different perspectives was necessary. It is necessary for government programs to assure 
that they address important strategic performance objectives in a measurable way.   The 
Balanced Scorecard for NMCI is a DoN process that is designed to provide the Navy and 
Marine Corps leadership with tools to judge how well NMCI is supporting the missions 
and strategies of the Department. Furthermore, the main idea is not to simply collect and 
analyze data, but also use it to drive improvements in their organization and the 
associated programs. The five different domains shown in figure 43 are used to evaluate 
the NMCI performance and provide focus on how NMCI is supporting strategic goals: 
Customer Stakeholder
Learning & Growth
Internal Business Processes Financial
 
Figure 43: Balanced Scorecard Perspectives, from www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance 
Measures), accessed February 2004 
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Performance measurement and review may be the weakest link in today’s 
managed services programs. The relationship between the customer and the services 
contract provider needs to consist of mutual understanding and cooperation. This 
relationship can only be strengthened when it is also based on independent, accurate and 
up-to-date performance measurements and reviews. Therefore, a multidimensional 
approach is necessary to provide the full picture of the NMCI performance. 
1. Customer Perspective 
The first and most important component used in the NMCI evaluation is the 
customer perspective, expressed in terms of the NMCI’s impact on the end user. Specific 
targets like the level of effort to access the offered IT capabilities, including seamless and 
faster handling of information and the overall security level have been defined and data is 
collected through surveys or automated software tools that capture statistical details. 
 
Figure 44: Customer Perspective used in the evaluation of the NMCI Performance, from 
www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance Measures), accessed February 2004 
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2. Stakeholder Perspective 
NMCI is not only about delivering a better communication capability. The second 
component within the NMCI’s performance matrix is the stakeholders’ perspective, 
expressed via the impact at the various commands or even at the Department-wide level 
mission. Main areas of concern are the interoperability issue along with the adaptation of 
improved business practices and alignment if necessary with the commercial sector 
practices. The driver of the stakeholder perspective is to increase effectiveness of the 
personnel with the IT support allowing for reduced manning and to provide increase 
combat capability to the DoN, by “utilizing” commercial sector experts to further 
improve and solve problems of the associated infrastructure.  
 
Figure 45: Stakeholder Perspective used in the evaluation of the NMCI Performance, 
from www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance Measures), accessed February 2004 
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3. Learning and Growth 
As already shown in Figure 43, this perspective overlaps with all the other 
domains used in the NMCI performance evaluation. The main idea is to promote 
innovation and introduce collaborative tools to achieve a better level of cooperation 
among the various elements of command. Again, it is necessary to use a combination of 
surveys along with statistical analysis to reach a measurable result. 
 
Figure 46: Learning and Growth Perspective in the evaluation of the NMCI Performance, 
from www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance Measures), accessed February 2004 
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4. Financial Perspective 
The financial perspective includes a variety of estimates to determine the 
economic value related to this IT investment to include Return On Investment (ROI) and 
ratios used to describe improvements between the previous “As-Is” state and the current 
state under NMCI operation.  
 
Figure 47: Financial Perspective in the evaluation of the NMCI Performance, from 
www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance Measures), accessed February 2004 
5. Internal Process Perspective 
Because NMCI is implemented under an “enterprise” paradigm it is also 
necessary to include performance estimates related to the overall support of the DoN 
mission and requirements. The pace of the introduction of technology is monitored along 
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with the necessary refreshment attempts. The specific domain also captures portions of 
the IA aspect and especially focuses at the level of protection of the network, to include 
reactions in case of intrusion.  
 
Figure 48: Internal Process Perspective in the evaluation of the NMCI Performance, from 
www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance Measures), accessed February 2004 
6.     Tools to Create the NMCI Balanced Scorecard 
The Predicate Logic, Inc., announced during the year 2003 that its tool 
TychoMetrics® has successfully gone through an extensive evaluation by the Gartner 
Group and Cranfield School of Management and was selected to deliver the NMCI 
automated Balanced Score Card (BSC). TychoMetrics can run on any TCP/IP network 
with the objective to harvest data from remote globally distributed sites using the 
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Internet, and by being NMCI certified, it runs on every Navy and Marine Corp desktop 
and provides a wide variety of “Smart-Metrics”. The specific software application is not a 
dedicated BSC application but a tool to automate metrics collection, derivation, and 
visualization of data. TychoMetrics® can be easily adjusted to support an IT environment 
where you have electronic data to harvest and analyze. The TychoMetrics® Tool Suite 
uses only Microsoft’s operating system environments. There are only two requirements to 
collect data from any source: the measurement source file must have visibility to the 
TychoMetrics® Mediator and the Mediator must have the probe/ probe agent that 
corresponds to the tool source. The Mediator is the behind the scenes component that 
automates the data collection process. The probe/ probe agent specifies the data to be 
collected.  The software tool can then report the data in various configurable formats 
including the BSC. (www.tyckometrics.com accessed February 2004). According to the 
company, TychoMetrics strengths include:  
• Automated data collection  
• Derivation and visualization of data/reporting, data sourcing and 
integration  
• E-mail alerts when metrics exceeds upper or lower control limits or 
thresholds  
• Statistical process control and management by exception  
The approach of the BSC is extremely useful in order to track and promote 
strategic goals at the “enterprise–wide” level. In order to have a sound approach within a 
service level contract it is necessary to have a performance measurement system in place 
that has the following characteristics:  
• Easily maintained and run by the customer’s (Naval) personnel. A single 
point of control would eliminate duplicate data and remove manning 
burden.  
• Automatic generation of performance analysis and change management 
reports.   
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• Automatic up-to-date, accurate and complete data about all computer 
hardware and software assets, and how and where they are deployed. 
Profiling data should be updated on a regular basis, i.e. daily, so that the 
latest profile data is always available to help make performance analysis 
and other decisions. 
• Easy access to reports and data by both the customer’s and the service 
provider’s personnel, at any time.  
C. HOW THE SERVICE LEVELS ARE MEASSURED 
 1. Establishment of the NMCI Contract Performance Levels 
The performance measures in the SLAs represent the current and validated 
operational requirements of the DoN. The NMCI SLAs evolved from the pre-established 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) during the negotiation phase, which in turn were 
based on the NMCI Design Reference Mission (DRM). The DRM approach was used in 
order to fully define the user mission environment and the general operating envelopes 
that the NMCI solution should support – thereby leaving to the service provider the 
ability to use best practices, new technology, innovation, and cost avoidance. The DRM 
describes the Navy and Marine Corps “use environments”, both tactical and non-tactical.  
A combined DoN operational, engineering and acquisition team was specifically formed 
to ensure a succinct capture of operational requirements for NMCI and an accurate 
translation of these into contract requirements developed all of these products. (NMCI 
Report to Congress, 30 June 2000, p. D-6-4) 
 
Figure 49: Establishment of SLAs, from the NMCI Report to the Congress. 
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a. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
The DRM provided the necessary details to articulate IT services needed 
for individual elements within the DoN to accomplish its mission. References to 
performance aspects of IT were narrowed down to the major factors that would 
significantly impact mission accomplishment.  Critical factors to establish the necessary 
IT environment were identified, prioritized, and assessed as to the ability to serve as a 
MOE. The MOE was the government provided performance curve and the SLA is a 
reference point on that curve which the contractor would propose.  To qualify as an 
MOE, that factor had to: 
• Be a meaningful indicator of the end-to-end NMCI service 
delivery performance (or provide an indication of how proactively 
the provider is addressing infrastructure performance needs) 
• Represent a factor or a specific group of factors that could be 
addressed and influenced by the provider 
• Be measurable 
 
Figure 50: MOE Performance Curve, from the NMCI Report to the Congress 
SLAs completely define the metrics that are be used to evaluate the 
network performance and the level of service provided by the contractor. Three tiers of 
the MOE hierarchy are presented. Three top-level SLA components, Assurance, Capacity 
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and Responsiveness, collectively define all of the relevant characteristics and 
performance of NMCI and are used as the first tier of a multi-tiered series of measurable 
units. The second tier, Availability, Survivability and Integrity, provide increasing 
specificity and detail in defining measurable areas of performance.  
 
Figure 51: MOE Analysis to Determine SLAs, from the NMCI Report to Congress  
b. NMCI SLAs 
During the development of the NMCI Request For Proposal (RFP) a 
decision was made to shift from providing the vendors with only MOEs towards adopting 
the industry standard practice of using SLAs. The DoN requirements were established 
with the focus on the maximum reliable communications and WAN performance (such 
that the WAN would operate as an effective extension of the LAN) in combination with 
maximized cost savings making therefore the obvious selection of setting the level of 
measurements at the knee of the industry cost performance curve. Benchmark values for 
the MOEs were translated to SLAs, and the breadth of coverage of these SLAs expanded 
to cover areas of IT service consistent with good seat management contracting practice. 
104 
Recognizing the evolving nature of IT infrastructure, the final definition of requirements 
related to NMCI is a process that has included evaluation of existing best business 
practices as well as military system performance parameters supporting both business and 
military applications. This process is iterative and sufficiently flexible to allow 
procurement of a “best value” service that is both consistent with current and emerging 
technologies and military uses of those infrastructure services. 
2. NMCI Performance Level Measures 
The Clinger - Cohen Act requires the establishment of performance measures to 
assess how well NMCI supports mission accomplishment and to provide accountability 
and evaluation of investment post-deployment.  Baseline service level performance for 
each of the domains in question and baseline cost for services under the previous DoN’s 
IT environment were assessed in the BCA for the NMCI and were documented in the 
“As-Is” Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) analysis section. Analysis of the technique 
currently in place to support the evaluation of the NMCI performance can be further 
broken down into distinct categories. 
a. Service Efficiency 
The economic effectiveness of NMCI is determined by comparing its cost 
versus the level of service provided. NMCI can increase its efficiency by either providing 
more services for the same cost, or it can reduce the price paid for the same level of 
services. The ratio of cost to services provided is the key indicator used to decide whether 
the contract is cost-effective. Service efficiency is a measure of the cost associated with 
supplying IT services to the DoN. The NMCI’s efficiency is monitored through the cost 
per service level, and not simply through costs or services total independently of one 
another.  Two measures are used to judge the effectiveness of NMCI in achieving service 
efficiency:  
• Direct cost per specified level of service 
• Indirect costs  
Costs include both direct costs (i.e., annual cost per seat) and indirect costs 
(as a monetary representation of productivity gains or as an indicator of IT system 
efficiency from an end-user perspective). Direct costs measure the costs that are typically 
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included in the IT budget. These include the costs of hardware and software, as well as 
the costs of network operations and administration, including labor costs. Direct seat 
costs are roughly comparable to the costs covered by the NMCI outsourcing effort. 
Indirect costs include many of the impacts of IT services on the end user that affect 
productivity, but are not explicitly covered in the IT budget. These costs include: (NMCI 
Report to Congress, 30 June 2000, p. J-5-5) 
• Informal computer support—time the end user spends either by 
himself or with peers supporting basic information management (IM)/IT 
services because help desks are not responsive  
• Learning—both formal and casual 
• Downtime—lost productivity due to network or software problems 
Basic user services (covered by different SLAs) that for the time being are 
used to measure performance include: 
• Standard office automation software 
• E-mail  
• Web access   
• Intranet performance 
• Internet access  
• Desktop access to Government Applications 
• User training 
• Search engine services 
• Directory services 
• News groups 
• Print services 
• Unclassified remote access  
• NIPRNET/SIPRNET access 
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• Portable workstation wireless dial-in 
• Software distribution 
• Mainframe access 
b. Interoperability 
Information interoperability is a key enabler necessary to share 
information throughout the DoN enterprise. The DoN, in order to ensure that the level of 
collaboration either within the Navy domain or with other external services would not be 
undermined under NMCI, put a lot of interoperability tests into the first increment of the 
contract to help erase these fears. [Note 1] Interoperability within the NMCI contract is 
defined, as the ability of the related with the NMCI IT systems to provide services to and 
accept services from other armed forces and facilitate communication and sharing of 
information. 
 
Figure 52: DoD Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI), from the NMCI 
Contract N00024-00-D-6000, (Confirmed Contract P00080) 
In order to achieve interoperability, applications need to achieve both 
connectivity and the capability to share data. For the time being, NMCI provides the 
connectivity required to enable the DON to achieve LISI level 2. Levels in the upper 
level of the hierarchy can only be achieved through integration of applications and a 
shared data environment. The NMCI is a critical component of the DoN's vision of a 
network-centric force, where a single secure, integrated network delivers all voice, video, 
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and data IT services to more than 360,000 seats in more than 300 locations. Through the 
standardization of hardware and software suites, and employment of common, multi-
layered security architecture, the NMCI will greatly improve interoperability and security 
across the Navy and Marine Corps. 
c. Security 
NMCI provides security services for protection of the Information System 
(IS), IS Domains (Communities of Interest) and Information Content (at rest, in use, and 
in-transit) in accordance with DoD’s IA policies and procedures.  Security services 
protect both unclassified and classified information and the aim is to achieve full 
integration with the DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) services. (www.nmci.navy.mil 
(Security Services), accessed February 2004) Security measures are used to compare the 
performance of the enterprise pre- and post-NMCI operations. The measures focus on:  
• The ability to detect and respond to security intrusions  
• The level of compliance and successful execution of good security 
practices (i.e. compliance with INFOCONs, IAVAs, PKI and 
Smart Card).  
The first set of measures (attacking the NMCI) is the “Red Team” 
approach, which will focus on quantitative evidence of how NMCI performs on 
protecting information and networks. This includes the results of exercises identifying 
vulnerabilities, numbers of intrusions, reasons for intrusions, and response time for 
correcting security problems identified by intrusions. The second set is analogous to the 
“Green Team”(“hardening” the security structure of NMCI). These measures address 
compliance with already established by the DoD security and information assurance 
procedures. They include such measures as the number of seats with smart card capability 
and utilization of public key infrastructure, evaluations of current practices and policies, 
and compliance time for such actions as INFOCONs and IAVAs.  
Specific IA SLAs are representative of the target performance measures 
for the range of IA functionality provided with NMCI. The IA SLAs are in two 
categories: Security Planning Services and Security Operational Services. Because of 
their critical role in the DON, two of the operational services–PKI and SIPRNET–have 
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been broken into separate SLAs. Utilizing a “defense in depth” strategy, NMCI is 
designed to provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, identification, access control, 
non-repudiation, survivability, and availability of the information and information 
technology (IT) systems in a network centric warfare environment. 
d. Network Operations and Maintenance 
Network management services include such disciplines as virus detection 
and repair, low impact upgradeability, scalable architecture, change management, and 
maintenance of the Local Area Network hardware and software. Systems management 
services include asset management, software/hardware inventory, software distribution, 
and systems management. 
NMCI Performance Measures 
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Table 8: NMCI Performance Measures, from www.nmci.navy.mil (Performance 
Measures), accessed February 2004 
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3. Automated Tools Used 
The service levels are monitored using an enterprise management system located 
at the NMCI network operations centers in Norfolk, Va., San Diego and Hawaii. 
(www.fcw.com (Navy, EDS to refine performance metrics), accessed March 2004) These 
facilities are where EDS and subcontractor’s personnel work alongside Navy personnel to 
monitor, maintain, repair and protect the network that comprises NMCI. EDS is 
deploying Cisco® Info Center to manage its service-level agreements (SLAs) with the 
NMCI. By using this automated tool, the NMCI administrators can more easily manage 
the daily operations of the intranet and demonstrate to the executive oversight committees 
how the network is performing on an ongoing basis and in real time. 
We are dedicated to providing the optimum level of service for NMCI, 
and this tool will help us monitor the system to verify that the elements of 
the enterprise network are performing, as they should 
 Bill Richards, EDS' NMCI Enterprise Client Executive 
Cisco Info Center, developed by Cisco and Micromuse, enables users to centrally 
manage and control infrastructure services. Through sophisticated service-level alarm 
monitoring and diagnostics capabilities, the system provides impact analysis, situational 
awareness and service assurance for SLA management and reporting. It also provides 
application, system, and network fault and performance monitoring; network trouble 
isolation; and real-time service-level management for enterprises. By interacting with 
other management tools, the specific automated tool has the ability to provide service-
level monitoring and network partitioning for virtual private network and customer 
network management services. Cisco Info Center provides real-time end-to-end visibility 
and accurate business impact analysis on IT-related faults. With direct and easy access to 
such vital intelligence, NMCI administrators are able to quickly prioritize workflow and 
focus on the most mission-critical problems first. (www.cisco.com (Products), accessed 
March 2004) 
Norfolk is the primary operations center; the San Diego facility also monitors the 
systems and is there for backup in case anything happens, no matter how major or minor. 
At each NOC facility there is a room — physically the heart of the center — where 
technicians monitor the vital signs of the systems at work. Overhead screens use traffic-
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light images to let everyone know the status of services by location, while individual 
monitors track each component in more detail. Availability of services within the 
network is defined as the percentage of time any service is available to the end user or the 
end user community. For the time being, EDS must meet roughly 200 metrics, ranging 
from help desk support to network response time. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations for the Performance Monitoring 
Methodology Currently Used 
a. Development of SLAs 
A service level agreement (SLA) gives both the DoN and vendors a 
baseline by which to determine whether the service contracted for is being delivered and 
a way to measure performance. It may have been difficult to get all user groups to totally 
agree on the requirements, however extensive risk mitigation techniques and feedback 
from a variety of end-user groups was used to deliver the final result. No matter that the 
approach to negotiate for the NMCI contract was established by a government agency 
(DoN) with minimum services contract experience, the procedures used to develop and 
define the SLAs were sound based on proven concepts already followed by the 
commercial/private sector business. Every aspect of the multi-billion NMCI outsourcing 
contract that covers voice, video and data services is outlined in a SLA with extensive 
details. A summary of the challenges involved and conclusions is shown in Figure 53: 
 
Figure 53: NMCI Challenges in the Development of the SLAs 
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b. SLAs and Related Metrics 
When the initial contract was written down it included 135 metrics within 
37 SLAs. Through the process of continuous adjustment there is now a total of 44 SLAs 
with 197 metrics. The complete description of the metrics involved can be found in Table 
D in Appendix D; however a breakdown with a short analysis of the metrics currently in 
use is shown in figure 54: 
 
Figure 54: The SLAs and Performance Measurements Matrix Currently in Use. 
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The initial idea of this thesis was that a number of metrics at the level of 
200 were too many and would only complicate the monitoring activity; therefore a much 
shorter version should be used. After a thorough examination of the method used to 
evaluate the NMCI performance, the final conclusion is that an increased number of 
metrics is needed to precisely describe the level of services provided. Additional 
validation is provided by the fact that the approach used by the DoN to create the 
associated metrics was similar to the practices followed by the private sector, and 
feedback from a variety of sources was used extensively. Finally, the magnitude of the 
effort and the technical complexity of the specific IT initiative also suggest that a 
tremendous amount of detail is necessary to fully capture the performance of the network. 
 It is necessary to note that specific services are monitored via a 
combination of metrics that span all the categories of performance measures analyzed in 
the previous section. For example there are specific SLAs that introduce a large number 
of metrics to provide the full picture of the related activities, such as all of the NMCI 
security related agreements.  Although the vast majority of the necessary metrics to 
measure and assess performance are already contained within the establish SLAs, with 
the precondition that periodically adjustments of the level is required to ensure to scope 
of this IT initiative, as an additional improvement it would be useful to allow the end-
users to access the quality of the training services they are receiving by the contractor and 
to provide feedback on the operation of the helpdesks or their views towards the sea 
shore rotation policies. Finally, technology insertion and refreshment should account for 
both the commercial sector and the other military services pace in a joint operations 
paradigm, making the adjustment of the matrix necessary.  
Under the NMCI contract, EDS is paid based on its ability to meet specific 
service levels on key measures, such as network uptime, availability of applications and 
help-desk response time. Upgrades to the systems are done on a scheduled basis at no 
additional cost to the government and payment is tied to service quality and customer 
satisfaction. The customer accepts less risk because an SLA makes the vendor 
responsible for meeting the target service levels, while the vendor gains the ability to 
manage customer expectations in a well-defined manner. Penalties could be imposed 
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when performance measures are not met. The SLAs generally should have three distinct 
components: 
• What are the services to be provided 
• What are the measured targets of service that the customer expects 
• What happens if the service provider fails to deliver the service it 
promises 
 From the technical point of view, among the items that should be included 
in the service metrics are network performance and reliability, service availability 
intervals, mean time to report a failure, message delivery time, the number of closed 
trouble tickets, completion times for moves-additions or changes, the level of voice 
services, multimedia capabilities; and user training. Each criterion should include low, 
medium and high service grades and be priced accordingly. For example, a high network 
availability guarantee of 99.9 percent uptime would cost more per user than a low 
network availability of 99.5 percent uptime. NMCI’s SLAs conform very closely to the 
above norm that prevails in the private sector through the distinction of basic, high level 
and mission critical subdivisions. Finally the metrics currently in use provide sufficient 
data to analyze the performance of the network with the help of automated software tools. 
The central point of management activity enforced by the NMCI approach facilitates the 
seamless monitoring activity of the network. A summary of the conclusions involved 
with the performance measures analysis is shown in figure 55: 
 
Figure 55: Summary of NMCI Performance Measurements Matrix  
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D. REASONS WHY THE END-USER IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH NMCI 
Reality as usual is very different from the planned in advance situation and when 
dealing with a change of that size, it is also logical to expect the creation of very different 
reactions within the DoN organization. There have been two major hurdles to overcome: 
the culture issues as people are forced to change the hardware and software they use or 
where they go for help-desk support and the massive number of existing legacy systems.  
1. Cultural Changes Needed 
In order to move towards the standard system, the NMCI implementing team 
must take users off personal computers and put them in front of standardized network 
terminals, in what is essentially a depersonalization of their desktop. There’s a price to be 
paid for the increased security. You can’t put your kids’ pictures up as screensavers 
anymore because it’s a security risk. Also there are cases that the idea of worse 
performance is just related to the end-users luck of knowledge for the whole NMCI 
concept. People tend to see NMCI only as a desktop rather than a full-service contract 
providing hardware, software, security, connectivity, service, repair, and the manpower to 
make it all work. It is the notion that the user “owns” his dektop that the Navy needs to 
clarify. The Navy needs to clearly explain the ideas involved with NMCI and its 
“enterprise-level” aproach. 
There are many complaints expressed by a variety of users that NMCI has an 
inferior performance than the previous state of IT operation. To clarify the level of 
expectetions associated to NMCI, there is a need to stress that the introduction of the 
Naval Intanet is an effort to create uniform standards and performance for all those under 
the DoN. For those that were below the desired performance bar as it was determined by 
the central authority, a new better IT paradigm has emerged. For those that through 
coordinated activities and funding available were able to deliver a superb IT enviroment, 
NMCI means that performance is often degraded. For example: 
• Longer logon times (often the main source of complaints and regarded by 
the non experienced user as indication of poorer performance in relation 
with the previous state of the network) 
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) logon requires more steps and time 
associated with  
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Additionally, with the current state of NMCI, there is a great difference in the 
culture level expressed in terms of the conflict between increased security and 
depersonalisation of the desktop. Security might be the main point of focus but research 
into complaints articles for NMCI indicates that users don’t like the NMCI concept or at 
least not filling comfortable with it  because appart from removing the current existing 
non-secure protocols, it also forces policies that can be regarded as restriction of 
personal freedom. I will provide a short and certainly not exhaustive list: 
• Incoming e-mails screened 
• Security lockout after 15 minutes  
• Websites blocked if non-secure practices are involved  
• NMCI limits wireless and PDA options 
• “Top to the Bottom” standardization and centralization, which limits local 
flexibility and even more creates the impression that the user is not using 
his/her “personal” computer 
• Desktop is “Locked Down” 
o Can not download Freeware, Shareware, or Games 
o No CD ROM installs by individual users 
To ease the cultural adjustment and provide training for the new NMCI system, 
EDS provides both an e-learning system and a two-tiered help desk approach. The web-
enabled training system is quite effective. The system is continuously updated with issues 
derived from user questions to the helpdesk. Help desk tier I takes all user calls, but deals 
only with problems that tend to be resolved easily. If not, they are escalated to tier II, 
where staff with more technical experience answers questions, but unfortunately the long 
waiting time involved with the handling of complex issues are creating the impression 
that the help-desk is only solving the minor problems and end-users still complain that 
support is not enough. The current state of the NMCI performance is still lagging from 
the DoN targets. However, end-user’s surveys show that satisfaction level with NMCI 
increases as time passes and research associated to the introduction of different IT 
capabilities in large scale organization indicates that customers get accustomed to any 
new system in the long run; however this process can take a couple of years. Change 
management practices are necessary to facilitate the transitioning period. 
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2. The Legacy Applications Issue 
A second point of interest is the progress with the legacy applications. The NMCI 
request for proposals called for a single operating system network. As a result anything 
that is not functional under a Microsoft Windows 2000 environment must be quarantined 
or connected via CLIN 32 (external network connection) or CLIN 29 (legacy system 
support). DoN and EDS officials have been bogged down for a very long time in 
reviewing applications to determine if they are necessary and, if so, testing them to 
ensure that they meet security requirements.  
The ISF has already established a Legacy Application Working Group to 
determine the processes necessary to move legacy applications into the NMCI 
environment. The process will include recommendations to the DoN on where it can 
reduce reliance on legacy systems. NMCI offers the DoN an opportunity to employ a 
state-of-the-art infrastructure, reduce the number of legacy applications and expand 
standardazation throught the whole DoN. Unfortunely it is again the end user that will 
face all the pain since new restrictions will be effective but he/she will still have to 
perform all the variety of “old” functions with the means of mismatching tools. The 
legacy issue also fed the culture issue because NMCI forced users to abandon well-worn 
applications, and they were often reluctant to do so, often without an alternative option. 
E. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES IN TERMS OF 
INFORMATION ASSURANSE (IA) 
NMCI has established a service level management program that monitors the 
performance of the NMCI network and the related security features. This performance is 
contractually binding and contains incentives for the contractor to exceed performance, 
security, and customer satisfaction parameters. Independent government teams monitor 
performance for compliance to the SLAs and requirements, while special “red teams” 
routinely assess network security. While perfect security in an information-sharing 
environment is almost impossible, there is much that can be done to minimize system 
vulnerabilities or potential threats. DoN uses a Defense in Depth (DiD) strategy that 
employs state of the art protection technology like content monitoring/filtering, firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems (IDS), encryption and PKI [Note 2] installed in a layered 
system of defenses to protect the NMCI. 
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Figure 56: NMCI Tools Protection Matrix, from the NMCI Contract N00024-00-D-6000, 
(Confirmed Contract P00080) 
 
Figure 57: NMCI Layered Defense 
The Naval Network Warfare Command (NAVNETWARCOM) determines the 
overall NMCI IA strategy and ensures its alignment with the equivalent DoD strategy. By 
focusing on Computer Network Defense (CND), with emphasis on Defense in Depth, the 
effort is to deliver a sound network. There is a mixture of DoN personnel and EDS’ 
employees within every NOC to facilitate network security activities, both offensive and 
defensive. Responses to network threats and attacks constitute Information Warfare (IW) 
defense command decisions that, as a minimum, will be authorized by designated, 
uniformed DoN personnel. The Navy’s command structure retains directive authority 
over all NMCI threat responses. DoN personnel are also the conduits for authorized 
responses to directives received from JTF CND (Joint Task Force Computer Network 
Defense) or joint service regional headquarters for coordinated joint service response to 
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threats. As the Information Condition (INFOCON) level is raised during time of conflict, 
DoN personnel will retain the command decision authority. The security safeguards that 
DoN receives with NMCI include: (www.nmci.navy.mil (IA and Security), accessed 
February 2004) 
• Detection 
o 24x7 surveillance against unauthorized intrusions  
o Defense against internal as well as external threats  
o Inoculated system with world-class anti-virus detection tools 
• Inspection 
o Continually monitoring the network and assessing potential threats 
to the IT environment  
o New tools and activities to inspect and protect systems 
• Protection 
o State-of-the-art firewall protection   
o High level of protection standardized across the whole Department 
of the Navy 
o Comprehensive password procedures to safeguard information 
o Implementing Information Assurance 
• Reaction 
o Alerts security personnel of virus contamination 24x7.  
o Quarantine contaminated files, limiting potential damage 
o Automated reports of unauthorized intrusions to the Navy and 
Marine Corps security teams. 
The creation, operation and use of information infrastructures for productive ends 
involve three principal types of activity (Gregory J. Rattray (2001), Strategic Warfare in 
Cyberspace. Massachusetts-USA: The MIT Press, p. 32): 
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• The development and use of underlying technologies, including hardware 
and software products and orchestration of standards and protocols used 
• Provision of networks and services that link underlying technologies to 
provide information processing, storage and transmission capabilities for a 
wide range of users 
• Use of information technologies and networks by individuals and 
organizations to perform desired tasks 
An organization like the DoN should conduct all three type of activity 
simultaneously to optimize an IT system like NMCI for its requirements, but 
coordination of activities to deliver a completely secure structure is extremely difficult. 
The complexity of the technologies involved has resulted in the involvement of a 
multiplicity of different organizations (beyond military control) in the creation of the 
NMCI and although the approach used might have established a very strong security 
mechanism, there are still potential threats. A summary is shown in figure 58: 
 
Figure 58: List of NMCI Potential Threats 
Naval networks are not immune from hackers or malicious code and are a prime 
candidate target for state sponsored attacks. A wave of destructive worms has focused 
attention on the potential vulnerability of the NMCI and other military networks to 
malicious computer attacks. In particular, the Blaster, SoBig, Welchia and other worms 
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have spurred concerns about the unintended security consequences of the overwhelming 
worldwide use of and the increasing military reliance on the software products of a single 
company, Microsoft. The worms, viruses and Trojan horses mostly spread throughout 
corporate and personal computer systems through security flaws in the design of products 
from Microsoft, notably its Windows operating systems. To date, all branches of the U.S. 
military have consciously decided to standardize their enterprise networks on Microsoft 
products. As a result, military network engineers are discovering that the biggest threat to 
the integrity of their enterprise systems comes not from a coordinated cyber war effort, 
but rather from malicious code designed to spread as quickly and thoroughly as possible 
via Microsoft design flaws. 
In addition to the external threats that any network has to deal with, the Insider 
Threat to the NMCI should not be discounted or underestimated.  Included in that threat 
are the accidental or unintended actions that can undermine network confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), client intrusion detections, 
Active Directory Control and a host of other systems provide protections against the 
insider threat; however an “authorized user” can always undermine the security effort. It 
is still under question the level of the end –user training and their adaptation in the “best 
use” practices that can both make a significant difference. Additional, there is always the 
question of a dissatisfied EDS’ employee holding administrative privileges over the 
NMCI. 
While IT increases capabilities in the military domain, it also creates an increased 
reliance on the infrastructure necessary to support the associated networks. The threat to 
the GIG is extensive, increasingly sophisticated and a real danger to [the U.S.] national 
security. The threat includes nation-states, more than 40 of which have openly declared 
their intent to develop cyber warfare capabilities. It includes transnational and domestic 
criminal organizations, amorphous groups of hackers who sympathize with America’s 
enemies, and terrorist organizations, as shown by what the DoD has learned by forensic 
analysis of captured computers. It may also include insiders—trusted Americans who 
become traitors. (Major General J. David Bryan (Vice Director of Defense Information 
Systems Agency), article “IA: Holistic View, Targeted Response”, Military Information 
Technology, September 2003).  
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F. ENDNOTES 
1. An interoperability test plan to test the validity of each segment was 
provided by the contractor. The test plan provided measures of interoperability with 
respect to: Services such as Standard Office Automation Software, E-mail Services, 
Directory Services, Web Access Services, Newsgroup Services, NMCI Intranet 
Performance, NIPRNET Access, Internet Access, Mainframe Access, Desktop Access 
Government Applications, Unclassified Remote Access, Classified Remote Access, 
Organizational Messaging Services, Desktop VTC, Voice Communications, Wide Area 
Connectivity, BAN/LAN Communications Services, Moveable Video Teleconferencing 
Seat, Proxy and Caching Services, External Networks, SIPRNET, and Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). 
2. A firewall is a collection of hardware and software components that is 
used to provide protection for a defined set of users in a specified DoN’s enclave. There 
are different types of firewalls such as state monitoring firewalls, application layer proxy 
firewalls, and router-based firewalls. The DoN has chosen to implement application layer 
proxy firewalls at all entry points of the NMCI, therefore firewalls can be at boundaries 
1, 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Figure 59: Comparison of Main IDS Techniques 
NMCI incorporates both network and host-based IDS as part of the layered 
defense in depth strategy. Although a host based monitor can examine internal state 
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information that does not flow over the network, thereby tracking insider misuse and 
attacks that slip past a network sniffer (Network based IDS), both types of monitors are 
potentially vulnerable to bypass and sabotage, (Denning, p. 366) [an option open to a 
determined insider.] 
 
Figure 60: Why NMCI is Using PKI 
 
Figure 61: Service Taxonomy via Encryption-PKI and Digital Signatures 
Content monitoring is already used within the NMCI to provide another layer of 
defense. The NMCI incorporates content filtering products and techniques, because many 
forms of electronic information can contain harmful content such as viruses, worms, and 
Trojan horses. This “malicious code” can be transmitted across a network in a number of 
ways including SMTP email attachments, FTP file downloads, and Java applets. 
Numerous COTS products exist that can check these routes to identify such potentially 
harmful content. If properly configured and frequently updated, these tools can identify 
harmful content before it has the chance to do any damage, and in many cases can repair 
already damaged files. (NMCI Contract N00024-00-D-6000, (Conformed Contract 
P00080), Attachment 4, p.12) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Network-centric warfare (NCW) establishes the idea that networks, as warfare 
enablers (force multipliers), are becoming increasingly necessary and important to the 
modern military. FORCEnet is a transformational architecture for the Navy and Marine 
Corps that integrates sensors, networks, decision aids, weapons and supporting systems 
into a highly adaptive human-centric maritime system that operates from the seabed to 
space and from sea to land.  To secure future readiness and achieve knowledge 
superiority requires the horizontal integration of NMCI and IT-21, including an effective 
management of the associated data flow. FORCEnet is intended to be the seamless link to 
conduct Joint Forces Operations and even accommodate expansions that fall within the 
Allied/Coalition Forces domain. The Navy Marine Corp Intranet (NMCI) is a critical 
element on the path towards FORCEnet by providing synergy through network 
integration and facilitating knowledge management at the DoN level. 
    
Figure 62: The Road towards FORCEnet, from www.forcenet.navy.mil (What is 
FORCEnet?), accessed February 2004 
NMCI's mission is to plan, coordinate and align the DoN’s information 
infrastructure (enterprise systems and data) under a single, coherent and forward-looking 
strategy. The driver for NMCI is to provide war-fighters and decision-makers the right 
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information at the right place at the right time. Through a single service contract, NMCI 
will provide end-to-end connectivity for all Navy and Marine Corps personnel with 
voice, video and data services. NMCI is the foundation that will enable DoN-wide web-
based processes, knowledge management and e-business solutions. With NMCI and  new 
approach of “IT as a utility”,  apart from dealing with the “bandwidth-starvation” 
problem, the DoN is expected to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in all facets 
of naval operations and to become a relevant, current and highly sophisticated player in 
the new “digital-type” economy. Web-enabling the Navy is vital for access to more 
effective business and combat applications. 
  
Figure 63: The IT as a Utility Approach 
A. NMCI AT THE DON LEVEL 
The NMCI implementation effort and the initial performance of the Intranet have 
often been below the DoN’s expectations and visions, therefore offering the opportunity 
for severe criticism. For example, lack of change management practices resulted in a 
hostile behavior from specific users, as was the case for those that were forced to use two 
separate desktops on their desk to perform exactly the same job as before. Obviously, this 
“dual desktop” phenomenon did not provide a suitable working environment to the 
workforce and had a negative impact on the users’ productivity.  
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Research of articles that describe end-users’ complaints related to the early stage 
of the NMCI shows that very often requirements or expectations of special users groups 
were poorly addressed or not taken into account at all. The initial training provided by 
EDS to the users in the majority of the cases was not sufficient and the help-desk 
personnel had minimum “hands-on” experience. Often the new procedures were not 
explained adequately enough to the end users before declaring the operational status of 
the site. As a result users choose to avoid the help-desk and direct complain to the NOCs 
personnel with the hope that their demands for technical support would be solved faster.  
In a specific number of commands, the IT operational environment was already 
extremely high and the introduction of NMCI destabilized the already effective IT 
functionality. As a direct result, the negatively impacted users lost their confidence in 
NMCI and the reputation of the program within the DoN community diminished. In the 
next facility scheduled to join the Intranet resistance to accept the implementation was 
increased and additional time was necessary to overcome “cultural” obstacles.  In most of 
the sites, transition to the “cutover” required additional time and resources than the 
normal IT staff, resulting in degraded IT support at the early stages. Many times there 
were inconsistencies among the technicians implementing the infrastructure. Finally, in a 
variety of sites the EDS processes and instructions to the technicians were incompatible 
with the DoN practices, and an extended timeframe along with a revised technical 
approach were necessary. 
 However, after all the NMCI is an “IT equalizer” effort and an attempt to enforce 
a centralized decision mechanism on IT acquisition. Complains are still present, because 
the NMCI introduction has created a certain number of users that under the “cumulative” 
approach receive a reduced level of IT services than when commands were individually 
responsible for IT support. Experience of EDS and the DoN with managing the NMCI 
introduction has improved dramatically within the last year, although some of the same 
types of mistakes were repeatedly made. Despite some of the negative views that still 
remain within specific groups of users, NMCI is not only making steady progress but also 
the DoN is slowly discovering the promised benefits from its decision to tackle 
information technology acquisition in a more innovative way. The vast majority of NMCI 
users are satisfied with the new infrastructure, according to survey results released by the 
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NMCI director's office in the year 2003. Overall satisfaction is higher than 70 percent and 
is increasing as time goes on and more users are moved over to the system. The end state 
objectives of NMCI can be summarized as follows: 
• Replace diverse Navy networks with single enterprise-wide network 
• Improved security across the DoN enterprise 
• Common “look” of the desktop 
• Regular technical refreshments 
• Implementation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and introduction of a 
records management 
• Create shore IT infrastructure to allow conversion to e-business model of 
common corporate applications and databases 
• Affordable IT management within existing DoN budget 
• Enable innovation 
 
Figure 64: The NMCI Operational Value, from the NMCI Contract 
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At the moment, NMCI offers: 
• Completely automated IT asset management  
• Application standardization at the “Enterprise” level 
• Increased security posture and improved data management  
• Automated backup and restore of data 
• Automatic service desk problem management and resolution  
 
Figure 65: Description and Financial Bennefits of NMCI for the DoN, from Rear Admiral 
Chuck Munns, U.S. Navy, NMCI briefing at the SPAWAR-Industry Day, San Diego-
USA, 23rd October 2003 
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A summary of the NMCI benefits is shown in Figure 66: 
 
Figure 66: Summary of NMCI’s Benefits 
Currently in the final stages of deployment, there is a much more mature approach 
towards the NMCI managing activity. The NMCI enhances security, improves 
standardization, reduces duplication of data and introduces well-coordinated back-up 
practices. Finally, the NMCI approach has the potential to reduce IT support costs while 
giving the Navy and Marine Corps universal access to integrated data communications 
and videoconferencing capabilities. The Intranet is now operating at a more balanced 
level and helping to speed up a variety of activities that support the DoN’s mission, from 
administrative tasks to ammunition supply. The common network capability provided by 
NMCI is finally increasing combat readiness and effectiveness, through an “enterprise-
wide” approach. For example, the introduction of the Navy Marine Corps Portal (NMCP) 
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will provide an integrated, collaborative environment with personalized, role-tailored 
access of information in real time for the NMCI users. A single integrated portal structure 
will allow DoN organizations to focus solely on content delivery and avoid the costs of 
individually developing portal features and functions.  
  
Figure 67: The Architecture and Connection Points of NMCI  
After the 360,000-plus data seats for NMCI are completely cut over, which EDS 
plans to finish within the year 2004, the Navy and the vendor will begin work on the 
enterprise voice and video components that are another “neglected” critical element 
within the NMCI approach. The “voice” portion of NMCI has been shifted to a later date 
of implementation to keep pace with industry’s transition of quality voice over Internet 
protocol (Voice over IP). VoIP means that phone numbers are no longer tied to an 
individual handset, ideal for workplaces where employees hot-desk. Each person can be 
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assigned a phone number, which goes to the nearest phone whenever they log into the 
computer system. 
1. The Current Stage of the NMCI Implementation 
At the time being, the ISF has assumed responsibility for a little over 300,000 
seats, with more than 160,000 seats already moved to the cutover stage. Three network 
operation centers are fully operational: San Diego, California; Oahu, Hawaii; and 
Norfolk, Virginia. A center also is almost complete at the U.S. Marine Corps base in 
Quantico, Virginia and help desks are in place in Norfolk and San Diego. During the 
startup years of the NMCI program, challenges have surfaced primarily in legacy 
applications but also in terms of change management. However, by working in a more 
coordinated manner with the ISF and with the NMCI supervising team now more mature 
and experienced, the DoN has employed some creative solutions to address these issues, 
hence the progress of the NMCI continues.  
 
 
Figure 68: NMCI End State, from Captain Chris Christopher, U.S. Navy, NMCI Briefing 
for the Joint Logistics Council, USA, 29 March 2001 
NMCI contract’s coordinator EDS Corp. announced with its last dismal quarterly 
financial report that the company never expects, up to the seventh year of the contract, to 
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realize a profit from the multibillion-dollar project, and the company is now in a 
relatively weak financial position. Improving the NMCI’s service levels should be a top 
priority for EDS, which can receive significant financial rewards if 85 percent or more of 
NMCI users report that they are satisfied with such items as help-desk responsiveness 
and network performance.   
Many times, the EDS’ approach was flawed or unrealistic, and in dealing with the 
entire Navy and Marine Corps all at once, the company faced severe resistance and in the 
majority of the cases outright hostility. Changing the paradigm from computers as 
individual property to a point of service is a major shift, and it has been an issue that had 
to be addressed at every site. Each installation facility had its own history and culture that 
resulted in a peculiar behavior regardless of what the DoN guidelines were. EDS also 
plowed into a thicket of legacy applications. However, the blame is not only for the EDS 
side. The biggest problem with NMCI, which the company won in October 2000, was 
that neither EDS nor the Navy knew the full scope of the challenge.  
The discovery of thousands of legacy applications on obsolete computers vastly 
complicated the project. Neither the DoN nor the vendor had any idea how many 
applications would have to be dealt with and unfortunately it turned out to be at the 
100,000 level. In order to deal with the problem and continue with the creation of the 
Intranet a variety of techniques like the “quarantined seat” and “dual desktops” approach 
[Note 1] were used as shown in figure 69. 
 
Figure 69: The NMCI Construction Zones, from Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, Director of 
NMCI, NMCI Progress Briefing, at the NMCI – Industry Symposium 17 June 2003 
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Finally, EDS may have underestimated Navy and Marine Corps network 
configurations complexity or undervalued its bid on purpose, hoping to a stream of 
profits from the additional services offered to the DoN. EDS wouldn’t be the first 
company to price products on a large project at a loss, counting on customers to load up 
on expensive options. But the slow pace of the NMCI implementation resulted in very 
few additional services to be ordered by the individual commands and the NMCI bid 
evaluators weren’t fools. The DoN got a great price on a truly transforming project that 
forced what the senior leadership believed was necessary changes. The SLAs have 
worked in favor of DoN up to now and the logical conclusion is that even with the 
various mishaps and inconveniences, the Intranet is an extreme valuable asset to the 
Department, which should be willing to continue its business relationship with EDS. The 
experience that EDS has already acquired through implementing and operating the NMCI 
is the most valuable foundation for the future NMCI success. It would take a tremendous 
amount of time to rebuilt “trustworthy” relations with a different vendor, (who might also 
repeat EDS’ mistakes). 
Both vendors and government agencies should be realistic in pursuing 
outsourcing and performance contracts. Winning only to lose isn’t a formula for 
sustained success on either side. Based on the idea that the NMCI project and the 
associated benefits are extremely valuable for the DoN, whatever the NMCI’s ultimate 
outcome, there’s a lesson here: There's a lot more to service-level agreements (SLA) than 
gathering metrics or monetary incentives and penalties. There should be a strong 
involvement from the DoN personnel in the technology selection/refresh of the contract. 
Planning and continuous reviews are necessary in order to insure that the NMCI approach 
is executed properly. At the initial launch of NMCI, there was an over reliance on EDS to 
deal with all aspects without any strong support from the DoN. As a buyer of services to 
be delivered under an SLA, the DoN must be as involved and proactive as it would be 
under a normal service contract.  
IT managers should consider when buying services under an SLA 
(www.computerworld.com (How to Buy the Best IT Performance), accessed March 
2004): 
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• Technology proposed for a project  
• Measurement criteria for the SLA  
• Frequency of measurement 
• Frequency in reporting 
• Request regular periodic reviews 
The execution of the NMCI contract has proven a financial drain for EDS’ 
resources. There is always the possibility that it is the contractor not the DoN that might 
step away from NMCI. Setting realistic SLA goals will go far in achieving overall 
success. Making it too easy usually means that users or the parent organization aren't 
getting their money's worth; making it too difficult will increase expenses and cause 
problems in the relationship with the vendor. The data gathered from the operational 
evaluation must be compiled with other information that is being collected and used to 
determine how to make improvements by adjusting the SLAs if necessary.  
The conclusions of the operational evaluation should be the new basis to establish 
a feasible SLA level that fully conforms to the DoN requirements and at the same time 
delivers value to EDS. Along the same lines; there is also a need to provide clarity in the 
NMCI future budget. Concerns over the difficulty of identifying the total cost of the 
NMCI effort in the DoN budget documents have been repeatedly expressed. Apart from 
renegotiating the SLAs, another possible solution for the NMCI future would be to 
provide additional finance by using funds already allocated for older IT procurement 
programs that the NMCI will supersede. Renegotiation the Voice and Video aspect of the 
NMCI might also be necessary, because of the delays involved. Also economies of scale 
could be present via reducing telephony costs through the VoIP introduction. 
The main idea of this thesis is that that the IT initiative is very close to the point to 
deliver the promised intangible benefits and added value to the DoN enterprise. If 
necessary, additional resources can be allocated to further stabilize and improve the 
operational state. NMCI will enable connection to the U.S. national infrastructure, extend 
sharing and creation of knowledge and expertise worldwide, and change the way training 
is conducted. On the other hand, there still are a significant number of related activities 
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that need to be completed before enjoying the full NMCI benefits and justifying the need 
for an increased budget: 
 
Figure 70: Activities to Supplement the NMCI, Rear Admiral Chuck Munns, U.S. Navy, 
NMCI Director, at the SPAWAR Industry Day, San Diego-USA, 23rd October 2003 
2. Cultural Adjustment and the Legacy Issue 
It is necessary to demonstrate crystal clear to the end users that the future will be 
better. Up to the year 2003, DoN had whittled down its 100,000 legacy applications to 
almost 30,000, through a process of eliminating duplicate or obsolete software. That’s 
still not enough, when you consider that the Marine Corps are now operating with only 
320 legacy applications. 
 
Figure 71: The Reduction of Legacy Applications 
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It is crucial to point out the importance of the legacy integration. The longer the 
DoN supports systems outside of the NMCI security umbrella, the longer a potential 
malicious entity could take advantage by exploiting those vulnerabilities. So there's a real 
need for speed to get everything inside the NMCI boundaries. Even if everything is not 
working perfectly in NMCI, being inside that security perimeter is the really important 
for security and probably the only way to significantly raise the defense levels.  
But it is not only necessary to remove applications logistically from the inventory. 
Based on the results of the FAM evaluation that was described in chapter three, effort 
should be given in order to develop new applications in the NMCI setting to replace those 
legacy ones that are considered of extremely high value. The users then will be more 
willing to embrace NMCI if they have tools necessary to do the job and adequate training 
is given. Instead of managing the “Legacy Inventory” in a top to bottom approach, there 
is the solution to redesign and deploy the necessary applications within the Windows OS 
environment of NMCI, by adapting commercial available tools as the basis of the 
business rules used. That means that instead of conforming software to the DoN business 
rules, there is also the option of slightly adjusting the business rule to conform to the 
already available applications of the commercial sector. Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) could be the best example of this type of activity, and the DoN should be 
committed to make the current pilot programs a complete success. 
Another point of interest is the help-desk function provided by EDS. It is not only 
necessary to improve the quality of service by the personnel involved, but also to 
consider the user’s view. The user needs support right now without having to wait in a 
telephone line. If the majority of questions cannot be answered locally then a highly 
specialized team should be created to deal with complicated tasks. Even more they will 
be able to take advantage of lessons learned, since statistically the same type of problems 
will happen again, and they will have the necessary experience by solving it the first 
time. In addition phone based or web based automated guides should be provided to the 
user in the form of “self-help”, with the option to talk with help-desk representatives, if 
the user is still facing a problem. What I am suggesting is an organization of help-desk 
service in a form of multiple tier, where the central zone has the talented people for the 
difficult tasks and the middle zone a high number of operators to facilitate the large 
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number of requests, while the automated voice or web based systems in the outer zone 
provide problem screening.  
 3. The Security and IA Aspect 
The 21st century presents new challenges for continued maritime 
dominance and national security. We have crafted an approach we call full 
dimensional protection. Joint Vision 2020 states that full dimensional 
protection is achieved “through the tailored selection and application of 
multi-layered active and passive measures.” For the DON, that protection 
takes three forms: (1) protecting knowledge pathways through information 
assurance and defense in depth, (2) protecting our centers of knowledge 
through critical infrastructure protection, and (3) protecting our knowledge 
workers through efforts to protect individual privacy.  
David M. Wennergren, DoN Chief information Officer (DON CIO) 
 
From the technical point of view, NMCI provides the DoN with enterprise-wide 
continuity of operations. NMCI’s state-of-the-art facilities and high-availability 
architecture eliminate significant vulnerabilities, such as maintenance-related outages and 
single points of failure. 24x7-monitoring activity protects the Intranet against emerging 
threats, and business continuity planning aims to assure its safe future. An analysis of the 
NMCI approach to protect the preserve data and systems is shown in figure 72. 
 
Figure 72: The NMCI Approach to Ensure Continuity of Operations, from EDS Corp. 
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When each subordinate command had its own network, many had poor security 
and some had none. The NMCI initiative is rooting out vulnerabilities and provides 
uniform security standards. Although protecting all the type of information and data flow 
can be a challenge, because the NMCI network carries many types of messages (from 
service members' personal e-mail messages to highly classified intelligence data, 
combating orders or even wartime decision-making videoconferences among officials), 
with the defense-in-depth (DiD) approach security protection mechanisms are employed 
in multiple locations within the network architecture. Through the enterprise-wide 
network, the Navy can conform to the DoD requirements. When a threat is identified, a 
defensive measure can be pushed out to the entire Intranet quickly, via the Network 
operations Centers (NOCs). Of course a layered approach to defense can always be 
improved. For example, defense in depth could mean layering link encryption over 
network protocol encryption, and further layering it over application layer encryption.  
Another example would be to use two different anti-viral packages, one at the 
firewall/application server and another (from a different vendor) installed at the end-user 
workstation. 
a. Additional Efforts from the DoN Needed 
 
Figure 73: A Breakdown of the Necessary Component for the Defense in Depth Strategy. 
As shown in figure 73, there is a very important element within the DiD 
strategy that is currently underestimated, namely the human factor contribution. Apart 
from the increased number of qualified IT administrators necessary to support the secure 
operation of the Intranet, the magnitude of NMCI and the excessive number of users 
associated indicate that computer security training should be included at the Basic 
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Training Level for all DoN personnel. In order to ensure adequate security and “best 
practices” behavior from the end user, there is a need to establish adequate training and 
practice at the very early stages of building qualifications.  There is the opportunity to 
create the necessary “cultural” foundation to promote effective safeguards and behaviors, 
by educating the end user early enough and before even allowing him/her to use the 
DoN’s IT systems. 
To facilitate IA responsiveness, additional technical capabilities are 
required, including the ability to observe and identify risks in the NMCI operational 
environment. There is the need to predict potential malicious activity and take actions to 
proactively adapt the environment to prevent potential threats. If the NMCI is attacked, 
the DoN should be able to identify the attempt in real-time and prevent the malicious 
activity from being successful. Trace-back capabilities to identify the attacker and gain 
attribution of the source of the attack to a legal degree of certainty are also necessary. The 
NMCI configuration, because of a climate of constant change associated to dealing with a 
variety of newly discovered or continuously evolving weaknesses, requires a network 
management system that is flexible, expandable and designed to meet current and future 
threats. 
 
Figure 74: Elements of Defensive Information Warfare and Information Assurance, from 
Dorothy E. Denning, p. 38 
Internal network security is still the most pervasive threat. After building a 
strong defensive posture for the external threat, the next important element is to deal with 
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the insider’s threat. As shown in figure 74, it is possible with a combination of adequate 
warnings and through introduction of a more strict policy related to the use of NMCI 
systems to deter an insider user from inappropriate or insecure behavior. Content 
monitoring is currently used within the NMCI to ensure availability and proper usage of 
government assets and bandwidth, and to provide another layer of defense. Now, more 
than ever, striking the delicate balance between personal privacy and national security is 
a challenge and the DoN should take aggressive measures to ensure the protection of the 
NMCI. There is always the option to allow preemptive randomly monitoring of the end 
user to discourage malicious internal activity. Of course this type of monitoring will have 
some negative impact to the workforce-DoN relationship and an additional thesis is 
needed to determine the effects of declaring to the end users that some of them will be the 
subjects of monitoring. The idea of randomly monitoring the activity of a selected NMCI 
user establishes an approach similar to random urinalysis, currently used to prevent the 
use of illegal drug by the DoD personnel. 
Spyware is a generic term typically describing software whose purpose is 
to collect demographic and usage information from a computer, usually for advertising 
purposes. The term is also used to describe software that “sneaks” onto the system or 
performs other activities hidden to the user. In general, Spyware is any technology that 
aids in gathering information about a person or organization without their knowledge. 
Data collecting programs that are installed with the user's knowledge are not, properly 
speaking, Spyware, if the user fully understands what data is being collected and with 
whom it is being shared. The official statement placed on NMCI computers is as follow: 
This is a Department of Defense Computer System. This computer system, 
including all related equipment, networks, and network devices 
(specifically including Internet access and access to restricted sites) are 
provided only for authorized U.S. Government use. DoD computer 
systems may be monitored for all lawful purposes, including to ensure that 
their use is authorized, for management of the system, to facilitate 
protection against unauthorized access, and to verify security procedures, 
survivability, and operational security. Monitoring includes active attacks 
by authorized DoD entities to test or verify the security of this system. 
During monitoring, information may be examined, recorded, copied and 
used for authorized purposes. All information, including personal 
information, placed or sent over this system may be monitored. Use of this 
DoD computer system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to 
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monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal 
prosecution. Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring 
may be used for administrative, criminal, or other adverse action. Use of 
this system constitutes consent to monitoring for these purposes. 
Although the current official statement is also sufficient, a possible 
solution in order to reflect the new policy of “Preemptive Monitoring” is to change the 
warnings for the end -user to read:  
This is a Department of Defense Computer System. This computer system, 
including all related equipment, networks, and network devices 
(specifically including Internet access and access to restricted sites) are 
provided only for authorized U.S. Government use, AS DESCRIBED IN 
XXXXXXXXXX. DoD computer systems ARE RANDOMLY monitored 
for all lawful purposes, including to ensure that their use is authorized, for 
management of the system, to facilitate protection against unauthorized 
access, and to verify security procedures, survivability, and operational 
security. Monitoring includes active attacks by authorized DoD entities to 
test or verify the security of this system. ALL USERS ARE REMINDED 
THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
THEIR USE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS. USE OF 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS, INCLUDING USE OF 
THE INTERNET AND E-MAIL, IS SUBJECT TO MONITORING, 
INTERCEPTION, ACCESSING AND RECORDING. During monitoring, 
information may be copied and used for ALL authorized purposes. All 
information, including personal information, placed or sent over this 
system may be monitored. Use of this DoD computer system, authorized 
or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. 
Unauthorized use may RESULT IN DISCIPLINERY ACTION BY DOD 
AND MAY BE PASSED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT subjectING you to 
criminal prosecution, IF APPLICABLE. Evidence of unauthorized use 
collected during monitoring may be used for administrative, criminal, or 
other adverse action. Use of this system constitutes consent to monitoring 
for these purposes. 
b. Efforts Needed from Actors outside the DoN Influence 
In the beginning of year 2004, Microsoft Corp., which provides the OS 
and a large variety of applications within the “Gold Disk”, released its first monthly 
security update, following a new schedule that attempts to ease the load on overburdened 
system administrators. The software giant's move to a monthly from a primarily weekly 
patch release schedule is a major change for system administrators bogged down by a to-
do list of fixes to apply to Windows computers. The software giant believed that the new 
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schedule would help administrators deal with the workload. However, on the 2nd of 
February 2004, Microsoft broke its once-a-month schedule to fix a critical flaw in 
Internet Explorer that could allow malicious coders to take control of an unwary user's 
PC. (www.news.com (Microsoft releases early IE fix) accessed February 2004) This 
action alone is the obvious proof that the patching activity is not working and enforcing a 
more organized introduction of delivering software code is necessary for the safeguard of 
IT systems. 
 
Figure 75: Components of CND 
The components necessary to create a secure network are described in 
Figure 75 In order to fully “secure” NMCI, there is a need to stress that software should 
be designed to be secure. Until now, Microsoft's efforts have largely centered on 
improving the way it writes its code and then fixing holes as they emerge. However, 
recent worm and virus attacks have repeatedly shown that many customers remain 
vulnerable long after patches have been released. The software giant is already 
committed to deliver more secure products and has launch its “trustworthy computing 
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initiative” with the goal to deliver the level of trust and responsibility that is expected 
from the computing industry: security, privacy, reliability, and business integrity. EDS as 
a business partner with the power of administering 3.3 million desktops and related 
software licenses worldwide has a significant interest to use more secure products   and 
should welcome the delivery of a better quality product from Microsoft.  
4. More Technical Challenges to Come 
More technical challenges for NMCI lay ahead. Under the DoD new policies, all 
IT acquisitions in support of the Global Information Grid (GIG) must be IPv6-compatible 
starting October 1, of the fiscal 2004. Improved end-to-end network security will be one 
of the major benefits of the DoD’s planned shift to the “next generation” Internet 
technology known as Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6). DoD Chief Information Officer 
John Stenbit announced in June 2003 that the department would upgrade to the new 
version of the Internet by the end of fiscal 2008.  
With IPv6, the sender of information could decide to classify it in a certain way, 
allowing a receiver to decode the data only if he or she has the proper encryption 
capacity. Such authentication is optional under IPv4, but it is a vital part of IPv6. The 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) designed IPv6 security to provide a uniform 
method of security across all applications and systems by implementing authentication 
with the IP security protocol. IP security protocol enables authentication at the network 
layer, layer 3, of the open systems interconnection (OSI) model for computer networks. 
The network layer is lower than the transport layer, layer 4, where much of the 
encryption for solutions such as secure hypertext transfer protocol (SHTTP), secure shell 
(SSH), and secure socket layer (SSL) occurs.  
The military services and other DoD components must set up IPv6 addresses and 
naming conventions with the assistance of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) by the end of the year. Major information technology manufacturers, such as 
Microsoft and Cisco Systems, already manufacture equipment and software compatible 
with both IPv4 and IPv6. Stenbit identified the major reasons for the commercial 
transition to IPv6 as a shortage of IP addresses, quality of Internet service, and security. 
IPv6 replaces the 32-bit addresses of IPv4 with 128-bit addresses, creating a nearly 
limitless range of address combinations rather than the few billion permitted by IPv4. The 
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increase in addresses is also designed to assist with the deployment of wireless devices. 
(Mickey McCarter, article: “Internet Shift Boosts Network Security”, -Military 
Information Technology, 1st of September 2003) 
The Ipv6 introduction and technical challenges topic was selected to demonstrate 
that NMCI would be an evolving entity and will also involve dealing with a series of 
technical challenges in the years to come. Careful planning in advance is necessary with 
extensive analysis of risks involved. The high value of this DoN IT asset indicates that 
the current managing team should be allocated a more extended timeframe in the same 
position, in order to take full advantage of their experiences. 
B.  NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL (NPS) AND NMCI 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) mission underscores the importance of 
advanced education and research to the future security of the U.S. and the world. 
Advanced education and research in the 21st century is rooted in and enhanced by IT 
functionality as an enabling tool for scientific discovery, learning, and communication. 
Every goal and strategy defined in the NPS mission is dependent either directly or 
indirectly on IT. At the time this thesis was near completion, it was made known to the 
public that NPS would join the NMCI soon.  
The NPS Information Technology Strategic Plan for the year 2003 raises serious 
concerns over the NMCI: 
• The academic environment is based on experimentation, testing, and 
development of new operating systems, software, and middleware. This 
requires putting things on the university network that would violate NMCI 
integrity. 
• Academic work is fundamentally based on peer review and collaborative 
work. As a result, NPS faculty and students engage in research projects 
with other universities, research centers and laboratories and access 
databases and research sources that would undermine NMCI standards. 
As already discussed, NMCI is a top to bottom approach to enforce uniform 
standards and create a centralized control mechanism for the acquisition and support of 
IT systems. NMCI introduction has improved the operational performance of many 
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facilities ashore; however the migration towards NMCI is a very delicate procedure 
involving many risks. To begin with, NPS is at the highest level of IT functionality 
among the DoN. NPS is already operating its “private” NOC and the current very high 
level of IT support is far above the average. NPS students are already IT aware when they 
begin their studies, and they expect their expertise to increase significantly as a result of 
their post–graduate education, therefore necessitating a superior IT support. Remote 
access from off-campus housing must also be considered within any discussion of 
network infrastructure and joining the NMCI. Faculty members at NPS are involved with 
research and educational programs that require advanced networking infrastructure, 
sophisticated user support, and access to high performance computing. NPS operates with 
clear and concise IT policies and procedures that support an uninterrupted operational 
state of the NPS’ Intranet and the introduction of a solely “educational” network is 
included in the strategic plans for the future.  
 No matter that the NMCI offers many economies of scale in terms of 
maintenance and technology refresh or software license acquisition and the opportunity 
to upgrade the infrastructure, by being a member of an “equal capabilities” initiative, 
there is always the danger that the end result for NPS will be to deliver inferior IT 
services. NPS has a different type of mission when compared with other ashore 
installations. Also, there are issues relating to supercomputing access and support. The 
Defense Research and Engineering Network (DREN) provides adequate service for DoD 
connectivity, but it suffers slowdowns and inefficiencies in connectivity to the 
commercial Internet. This creates problems for the NPS mission, as expanded capacity 
and speed are an immediate strategic priority. A main point of concern is that NPS is a 
research facility with a need to use Internet 2. [Note 2]  
 There should be extensive planning in advance in order to determine which 
activities the NMCI infrastructure will support and which of those that will remain in the 
previous state of IT operation. Additionally NPS must not only deal with the “legacy 
issue”, but with the software it produces. Under the NMCI umbrella, new software 
production is a security issue, requiring a very time consuming and complex procedure to 
evaluate software applications for security problems. A possible solution could be to 
separate the IT support into two different segments: One will be supporting the Academic 
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and Research activities and the second separate network will be supporting the 
Administrative Tasks. However, the NPS functionality includes a plethora of “Special 
User” groups that were often excluded from the original NMCI approach. An opportunity 
for a series of research activities is present to address all the issues related to the NPS IT 
future, which should be considered urgent and of great importance. Risk reduction 
techniques and every alternative option should be examined before the final decision for 
the NPS migration to the NMCI is made.  
C. ENDNOTES 
1. Quarantined: Preserve the previous state of desktop configurations even if 
the whole site was declared operational within NMCI. 
            Dual Desktop: Use of one desktop with NMCI standard configuration and 
a second one for the same user to support functionality that was NMCI incompatible or a 
potential security threat. 
2. Internet2 is a consortium being led by 205 universities working in 
partnership with industry and government to develop and deploy advanced network 
applications and technologies, accelerating the creation of tomorrow's Internet. Internet2 
is not a separate physical network and will not replace the Internet. Internet2 brings 
together institutions and resources from academia, industry and government to develop 
new technologies and capabilities that can then be deployed in the global Internet. Close 
collaboration with Internet2 corporate members will ensure that new applications and 
technologies are rapidly deployed throughout the Internet. Just as email and the World 
Wide Web are legacies of earlier investments in academic and federal research networks, 
the legacy of Internet2 will be to expand the possibilities of the broader Internet. The 
purpose is to: (www.internet2.edu (About Internet2) accessed March 2004) 
• Create a leading edge network capability for the national research 
community  
• Enable revolutionary Internet applications  
• Ensure the rapid transfer of new network services and applications to the 
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NMCI CONTRACT LINE ITEM NUMBERS (CLINS) 
CLIN Description Last Posted 
0001AA Fixed Work Station, Red Nov 13, 2003 
0001AB Fixed Work Station, White Nov 13, 2003 
0001AC Fixed Work Station, Blue Nov 13, 2003 
0001AD Fixed Work Station, Thin Client Aug 4, 2003 
0001AE Remote User Credit (Moved to CLIN 004105) Feb 19, 2003 
0001AF Fixed Workstation, Classified Thin Client Dec 15, 2003 
0002AA Portable Seat  Nov 13, 2003 
0002AB Ultra-Lightweight Portable Seat Nov 13, 2003 
0003AA Embarkable Work Station, Full Service Nov 13, 2002 
0003AB Embarkable Work Station, Limited Service Mar 26, 2002 
0004AA Embarkable Portable Seat, Full Service Dec 15, 2003 
0004AB Embarkable Portable Seat, Limited Service Mar 26, 2002 
0004AC Non-Ruggedized Deployable Portable Nov 13, 2003 
0005AA Basic Hybrid Seat Nov 13, 2003 
0005AB Enhanced Hybrid Seat Nov 13, 2003 
0005AC Reserved Jan 16, 2002 
0005AD               Personal Access Package - 100% Concurrent Use Aug 12, 2002 
0005AE Personal Access Package - 30% Concurrent Use Aug 21, 2002 
0006 Additional Standard Wall Plug Service May 21, 2003 
0006AA Additional Standard Wall Plug Service May 21, 2003 
0006AB Unclassified Wall Plug - Service Only May 21, 2003 
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0006AC Classified Wall Plug - Service Only May 21, 2003 
0006AD Unclassified Wall Plug May 27, 2003 
0006AE Classified Wall Plug - Inside a Controlled Access Area May 27, 2003 
0006AF Classified Wall Plug - Outside a Controlled Access Area May 27, 2003 
0006AG Project Wall Plug Nov 4, 2003 
0006AH Switch Port - Low Bandwidth Service Sep 22, 2003 
0006AJ Switch Port - High Bandwidth Service Sep 22, 2003 
0006AK Sub-Device IP Address Management Service Sep 22, 2003 
0007 High-End Upgrade Packages N/A 
0007 For CLIN 0001AA Fixed Workstation Red Nov 13, 2003 
0007  For CLIN 0002AA & 0002AB Portable Nov 13, 2003 
0007  For CLIN 0003AA Full Service Embarkable Nov 13, 2002 
0007  For CLIN 0004AA Full Service Embarkable Portable Dec 12, 2001 
0008AA Mission-Critical Upgrade Package - Single Connection May 21, 2003 
0008AB Mission-Critical Upgrade Package - Dual Connection May 23, 2003 
0009AA Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package Apr 22, 2003 
0009AB Switchable Classified Connectivity (Thin Client Solution) Oct 22, 2003 
0009AC Switchable Classified Connectivity (Dual CPU Solution) Mar 26, 2002 
0009AD Re-Bootable Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package Mar 6, 2002 
0009AE Switchable Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package 
(Dual CPU Solution/White) 
Mar 26, 2002 
0009AF Switchable Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package 
(Dual CPU Solution/Blue) 
Mar 26, 2002 
0009AG Switchable Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package 
(Dual CPU Solution/Portable) 
Mar 26, 2002 
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0009AH Switchable Classified Connectivity Upgrade Package 
(Dual CPU Solution / Non-Ruggedized Deployable 
Portable)  
Jul 24, 2002 
0010AA Basic Voice Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0010AB Business Voice Upgrade Package Dec 4, 2000 
0010AC Mission-Critical Voice Seat Upgrade Package Apr 9, 2001 
0010AD Pier Voice Line Dec 4, 2000 
0010AE Pier Voice Trunk Dec 4, 2000 
0010AF Commercial Voice Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0010AG Commercial Voice Connectivity Dec 4, 2000 
0011 Secure Voice Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0012 Mobile Phone Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0013 Personal Paging Service Seat Jul 24, 2002 
0014 Fixed Video Teleconference Seat Nov 4, 2003 
0015 Moveable Video Teleconference Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0015AA Basic Moveable VTC Seat May 22, 2002 
0015AB High-End Moveable VTC Seat May 22, 2002 
0015AC Mission-Critical Moveable VTC Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0015AD Premium Moveable VTC Seat May 22, 2002 
0016AA Additional File Share Services - Unclassified (10Gb) May 21, 2003 
0016AB Additional File Share Services - Classified (10Gb) May 21, 2003 
0016AC Email Storage - Unclassified (25Mb) Aug 1, 2003 
0016AD Additional Email Storage - Classified (25MB) May 21, 2003 
0017 Internet Access for Mobile Phone Seat Dec 4, 2000 
0018 Classified Remote Access Service Mar 26, 2002 
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0019 Reserved Jul 2, 2000 
0020 Data Seat Voice Communications Upgrade Apr 9, 2001 
0021 Defense Messaging System Data Seat Upgrade Mar 6, 2002 
0022AA Basic Desktop VTC Aug 1, 2003 
0022AB High-End Desktop VTC Aug 1, 2003 
0023 Optional User Capabilities Nov 03, 2003 
0024 Additional Non-Classified Account Apr 9, 2001 
0025 Additional Classified Account Apr 9, 2001 
0026 Additional Moves, Adds, Changes May 21, 2003 
0026AA Additional Moves, Adds, Changes Jun 26, 2003 
0026AB Physical MAC Group of 50 Jun 26, 2003 
0026AC Physical MAC - Group of 250 Jun 26, 2003 
0026AD COI MAC Jun 26, 2003 
0026AE Voice Moves, Adds, and Changes Sep 22, 2003 
0026AF VTC Moves, Adds, and Changes Jan 5, 2001 
0026AG Annual Administrative MAC May 21, 2003 
0026AH Annual Physical MAC May 21, 2003 
0026AJ Annual Physical MAC (Needing a Wall Plug) May 21, 2003 
0026AK Annual Embarkable MAC May 21, 2003 
0026AL Administrative MAC (Single) Jun 26, 2003 
0026AM Physical MAC (Single) Jun 26, 2003 
0026AN Embarkable MAC (Single) Jun 26, 2003 
0026AP Project MAC (Single) Nov 4, 2003 
0027AA Standard Low Bandwidth Application May 21, 2003 
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0027AB Standard Medium Bandwidth Application May 21, 2003 
0027AC Standard High Bandwidth Application May 21, 2003 
0027AD Mission-Critical Low Bandwidth Application Dec 4, 2000 
0027AE Mission-Critical Medium Bandwidth 
Application 
Feb 6, 2001 
0027AF Mission-Critical High Bandwidth Application Dec 4, 2000 
0027AG Legacy Application Server Connection Jun 26, 2003 
0028 Data Warehousing Nov 4, 2003 
0029 Legacy Systems Support Nov 4, 2003 
0030 Network Operations Display Jan 16, 2002 
0031 Military Personnel Core Competency 
Development (Sea-Shore Rotation and Operating 
Forces/Supporting Establishment Rotations) 
Jan 25, 2002 
0032 External Network Interface Nov 4, 2003 
0033 Information Technology/Knowledge 
Management Retraining Program 
Feb 6, 2001 
0034 Satellite Terminal Support Nov 4, 2003 
0036 OCONUS Service Jun 6, 2003 
0038AA Developer Fixed Workstation Upgrade Jan 16, 2002 
0038AB Developer Portable Workstation Upgrade Mar 26, 2002 
0038AC S&T Terminal Services Sep 22, 2003 
0038AD S&T Fast Ethernet Wall Plug Jan 16, 2002 
0038AE S&T Wall Plug Service - Modified Gigabit 
Ethernet Network Transport-Lots of 4  
Jan 16, 2002 
0038AF S&T Wall Plug Service - Modified Gigabit 
Ethernet Network Transport-Lots of 8  
Jan 16, 2002 
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0038AG S&T Wall Plug Service - Modified Gigabit 
Ethernet Network Transport-Lots of 16 
Jan 16, 2002 
0038AH S&T Network Transport - Other Nov 4, 2003 
004101 Desktop Support Feb 19, 2003 
004102 Desktop Refresh Feb 19, 2003 
004103 Desktop Refresh With NMCI Gold Disk Software Feb 19, 2003 
004104 Assumption of Responsibility Feb 19, 2003 
004105 Remote User Credit Feb 19, 2003 
004106 Remote User Credit (Japan) Jun 6, 2003 
0043 Asbestos Material Abatement Aug 1, 2003 
0044 Department of Defense Mentor-Protégé Program 
(0044AA - 0044AF) 
Dec 23, 2003 
 
Table A: List of CLINs Related with the NMCI Contract, (www.nmci-isf.com (Services 










































Table B: Monitoring Performance Criteria and SLAs, from the NMCI REVISED contract 
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APPENDIX C 




Table C: “Golden Disk” Revision History, from www.nmci-isf.com (Golden Disk 














































Table D: The SLAs and Performance Measurements Matrix Currently used, from 
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